US Supreme Court Missouri v. Seibert 02-1371

Decided June 28, 2004.

   Seibert's handicapped 12 year old son died.  Because he had bedsores, she was afraid that she would be charged with child neglect.  To avoid criminal charges, she and her two other sons (and some of their friends) conspired to dispose of the body by burning their trailer down.  In order to avoid the appearance that the now-deceased handicapped kid had been unattended at the time of the fire, they decided to burn a mentally ill kid (this one alive) with him.

   Seems legit, right?

   So they did, and the mentally ill kid (who had been living with these fine people) burned to death.  And the police figured it out.  In order to secure a confession, the police employed a question-first interrogation tactic.  Seibert was awakened in the early morning at the hospital where one of her living kids was being treated for burns, arrested, taken to the station, and interrogated at great length until she eventually confessed.  This sounds like it was a pretty intense interrogation, too... the detective kept squeezing her arm and repeating "He was meant to die in his sleep."  After half an hour of that, Seibert did confess.  She was then given a 20 minute break from interrogation.  Afterwards, the same detective resumed the interrogation.  This time he recorded it, opened with the Miranda warnings, and then once she had waived them he calmly led her through her earlier confession.  All very camera-friendly and nice, but with repeated references to her earlier statements (he began with "We've been talking about this for a while...").

   Unsurprisingly, Seibert confessed again.  At the trial, she sought to suppress all of her statements.  The trial court suppressed the pre-Miranda statements, but admitted the post-Miranda statements.  She was convicted of murder, and appealed.

   The US Supreme Court explained that the entire purpose of Miranda was to protect people's right against self-incrimination from the coercive pressures inherent in custodial interrogation.  Previous to this, the totality-of-the-circumstances test was used to gauge the voluntariness of statements.  The problem is that it's tricky for the court to really explore the circumstances of a stationhouse interrogation.  Miranda made custodial interrogation easier... if a suspect was not warned of his rights, any statements were going to be suppressed.  But if a suspect waived his rights, his statements were virtually certain to be admitted as voluntary.  Not foolproof, but pretty good.

   The courts have never asked for any particular phrasing of Miranda warnings, though.  The test is just whether or not the warnings sufficiently inform a suspect of the relevant rights.  But just like the courts have never asked for a particular rote phrase, they also don't afford any magic power to the warnings.  The simple recitation of the words "you have the right..." doesn't render a warning valid if for some other reason it doesn't suffice.  Such as where the manner in which the warnings are given is somehow calculated to circumvent a suspect's rights.  Such as in cases where a suspect is coercively interrogated until she confesses, and then some warnings are glossed over and she is casually lead through the same confession.

   Some lower courts described this sort of thing as "an end run around Miranda," and the Supreme Court agreed with them.  Since the second set of incriminating statements were the direct result of the unwarned statements, and since the whole interrogation was essentially the same event with Miranda in the middle (as opposed to two distinct interrogations), the Court held that all of the statements were inadmissible.

US Supreme Court Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, et al.

Decision here.

   A deputy sheriff in Nevada responded to a call of an assault, supposedly taking place in a red and silver pickup truck on a particular road.  When he arrived, the deputy found a truck matching the description.  There was a woman sitting in the van and a drunk man standing outside of it.  The deputy requested identification, which the drunk (Hiibel) refused to provide.  They went back and forth for a while, with the deputy asking for ID eleven times, and Hiibel refusing each time and eventually putting his hands behind his back and telling the deputy to arrest him (eleven times!! For real?).

   Nevada has a statute which authorizes the police to "detain any person whom the officer encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime."  The same statute authorizes the police to demand that the person stopped identify themselves, and makes it a crime for the person to refuse to identify themselves.  (Colorado also has a statute like that, but it's worded strangely... it authorizes us to stop suspicious people and demand identification, but it doesn't criminalize refusal to comply with a demand for ID.  Our statute also authorizes searches for weapons, a la Terry).  The deputy arrested Hiibel, and charged him with obstruction for refusing to identify himself as required by law (this also wouldn't fly in Colorado, since our obstruction statute includes an element of physical interference).

   Hiibel was convicted, and appealed his conviction.  He argued that the statute requiring him to identify himself violated his 4th and 5th Amendment rights.

   Regarding his 4th Amendment rights, the Supreme Court held that the stop was reasonable, and that the statute authorizing the stop and the demand for identification was also reasonable because it properly balanced a legitimate government interest (identifying people who are lawfully detained) against Hiibel's 4th Amendment rights.  Regarding his 5th Amendment rights, the court ruled that although it's possible that there are circumstances where providing one's name would be testimonial speech (and therefore possibly privileged), those circumstances would be unusual and this was not such a case.  So Hiibel's 5th Amendment rights were not violated.  The court left for another day the decision of whether or not someone could be compelled to identify themselves when doing so would somehow incriminate them.

   Hiibel's conviction was affirmed.

US Supreme Court US v. Knights 00-1260

Decision here.

   Knights was on probation for a drug offense when the facts of this case occurred.  One of the conditions of his probation was that he would "[s]ubmit his . . . person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer."  He was notified of this condition in writing, on a form that he signed.

   Whilst on probation, Knights was a suspect in an arson investigation (he was mad at the power company, which had caught him stealing electricity.  There was a series of 30 vandalisms to their facilities which coincided with his court dates, and the latest involved a fire that cause $1.5 million in damage).  A detective noticed the correlation, and set up surveillance at Knights' house.  He saw Knights' co-conspirator disposing of pipe bombs, and saw other explosives in the back of Knights' truck.  When Knights was gone, he searched the apartment and found more explosives, and a padlock with the power company's name stamped on it.  Because the detective was aware of the search provision in Knights' probation, he didn't bother getting a warrant.

   The evidence was initially suppressed because the search was done for investigative rather than probationary purposes.  The Supreme Court held that being a probationer subject to a search provision significantly diminished Knights' privacy interests.  The ruling states that "when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable." (emphasis added)

   Since there was clearly RS in this case, the search was valid and the evidence admitted.  The court declined to base its decision on the detective's motivation for the search, since an officer's subjective intent is irrelevant  to fourth amendment analysis.

   

Colorado Supreme Court People v. Haley 01SA148, 01SA149, 01SA150

Decided 11-27-01.

   Officer Miller was working drug interdiction on I-70.  He saw a car following a truck too closely, and made a traffic stop.  The car had three occupants, Haley was the driver.  During the stop, Officer Miller separated Haley from the passengers, noted that they were all acting nervous (shaking hands, licking lips, etc), and that Haley said they had rented the car to drive home (Kansas City) after flying to California for a week but the passengers didn't seem to know what their destination was.  He decided not to issue a traffic ticket, and told Haley that he was free to go.  Immediately after telling him he was free to go, he asked for consent to search the car for drugs with a K9.  Haley gave consent to search the luggage, but not the car.

   Haley removed the luggage from the car, and put it a few feet away.  Miller ran his dog on the luggage, and the dog didn't alert.  Miller ran his dog on the car (Haley protested this and shouted at Miller).  The dog alerted on the car, but then moved to protect Miller from Haley.  Miller put the dog back in the patrol car, then detained everyone for another ten minutes until other officers arrived.  When two more officers arrived, they searched everybody.  Haley and one of the other occupants resisted, there was a foot chase and a failed attempt to ditch the drugs, and eventually all three occupants of Haley's car were arrested and charged with a variety of offenses.  The trial court suppressed the evidence against them, and the prosecution appealed.

   The Colorado Supreme Court held that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the k9 sniff or to justify prolonging the traffic stop.  Also, Haley's refusal to consent to a search of the car could not be used to support reasonable suspicion.  The prosecution argued that a dog sniff of luggage and a vehicle in a public place did not constitute a search, but the court ruled that Haley, his luggage, and his car were only in a public place because they were being unlawfully detained by Ofc. Miller.  Accordingly, the drugs were suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.

US Supreme Court Kyllo v. US 99-8608

Decided June 11, 2001

   A federal agent suspected that Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home, which requires high intensity lamps.  As part of his investigation, he used a thermal imaging device to see if Kyllo's condo was warmer than his neighbors' was.  The scan took place from across the street, and from another street behind Kyllo's home, using a device that picks up infrared radiation.  The device found that a section of his roof was warmer than the rest of his home and a lot warmer than the other homes in the complex.  From this, the agent discerned (correctly) the type of lamp which Kyllo was using.

   Based on this information, and on the use of informants and information from utility bills, the agents got a warrant for Kyllo's condo.  They found an indoor grow with more than 100 plants, and Kyllo went to jail.  He moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing that the warrant was obtained using information from an illegal search.  The trial court denied his motion, so he conditionally pled guilty and appealed.

   The US Supreme Court observed that searches within a home are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but surveillance from outside the home does not ordinarily qualify as a search.  By simply looking at a house, the police are not infringing on any reasonable expectation of privacy.  The important question in this case is whether or not the use of sense enhancing equipment (like a thermal imager) converts ordinary surveillance to a search.

   The Court ruled that a search has occurred when the police use a sense enhancing device which is not in general public use, and which reveals information which could not otherwise be discerned from outside the area being searched.  So using a thermal imaging device is a search, since the police couldn't tell what temperature the inside of the house is unless they went into the house or used the device.  Since there was no warrant and no justification for a warrantless search, this search in this case was unreasonable and the infrared evidence had to be suppressed.  The case was remanded back to the trial court for a hearing on whether or not the other information used to apply for a warrant would have been sufficient to obtain one.

US Supreme Court Atwater v. Lago Vista 99-1408

Decision here.

   Atwater was stopped for driving without a seatbelt.  In Texas (where this took place), this offense carried a possible fine of $25-$50, and no possible jail time.  She didn't have her driver's license with her (although her identity was apparently known to the officer who stopped her.  Sounds like Lago Vista is a small town).  She was arrested for driving without a seatbelt, booked into the jail, and held for an hour before she saw a judge who released her on a $310 bond.  She eventually pled guilty to driving without a seatbelt and paid the $50 fine.  Then she sued the city.

   She sued under §1983 for violation of her 4th Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.  She argued that her arrest was unreasonable because common law at the time of the framing of the Constitution prohibited warrantless arrests for misdemeanors that were not a breach of the peace, and also because the offense she was charged with was not punishable by imprisonment and there was nothing about the circumstances of her case that made a custodial arrest necessary.

   The US Supreme Court makes it clear in their decision that the Justices were convinced this was a contempt of cop arrest.  They describe it as a pointless indignity and say that the officer was at best using extremely poor judgment.  But they side with the city anyway (just barely, this was a 5-4 decision).

   First, the court examines the historical record to try to clarify what the Framers of the Constitution would have meant by "reasonable."  It can be really interesting when the court does that, if you've got some extra time on your hands.  I'll spare you the long list of examples and tell you that the court decides that 1- the Framers weren't necessarily opposed to warrantless arrests for non-violent misdemeanors, and 2- the historical evolution of law hasn't moved in that direction, either.

   Second, the court examines the new rule that Atwater is proposing: that custodial arrests should be made only when an offense is punishable by jail time or when there is some other compelling reason to make a custodial arrest.  The court decides that this new rule would be unworkable for a variety of reasons.  It's not always readily apparent in the field whether an offense is punishable by jail time or not (such as when the actual weight of drugs seized is close to the line between a minor offense or a more serious one, when the officer doesn't know whether an offense is a first offense or a subsequent offense, or when a sentencing scheme is too complicated to be readily analyzed at the time that an officer is deciding whether or not to make a custodial arrest).  Also, turning the exercise of police discretion into a Constitutional question would invite excessive litigation, and would have a chilling effect on enforcement efforts that would outweigh the infrequent benefit of preventing unnecessary (but otherwise lawful) arrests.

   Finding Atwater's arguments lacking and her solution unmanageable, the court ruled that "if an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender."  That said, the court noted that the legislature is free to impose statutory restrictions on arrests for minor offenses (by passing a law requiring that a defendant be released on a summons for certain offenses or in certain circumstances).

US Supreme Court Florida v. JL 98-1993

Decision here.

   Police received an anonymous tip that a black male standing at a particular bus stop wearing plaid shirt was carrying a gun.  J.L. was a black male standing at that bus stop while wearing a plaid shirt, and there were two other people with him (only J.L. matched the suspect description, though).  Nothing else was known about the reporting party.

   Based on the anonymous tip, officers searched J.L. and recovered a handgun.  They also searched the other two guys, apparently because it was physically possible to do so.  J.L. was subsequently charged with CCW and with possessing a handgun whilst under 18.  He moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unreasonable search, and this case made it all the way up to the Supreme Court.

   The Court held that in order to establish reasonable suspicion, an anonymous tip must have sufficient indicia of reliability.  The only such indication put forth in this decision is "the correct forecast of the subject's not easily predicted movements."  The decision discussed another case where an RP predicted that a woman would leave a particular place in a particular kind of car and check into a particular hotel, and that she would have drugs.  That case had been deemed by the court to just barely satisfy reasonable suspicion.

   By contrast, the court held that the tip in J.L.'s case was not reliable enough to establish reasonable suspicion.  The court recognized that the RP specifically described J.L., but held that simply providing enough information to identify a suspect doesn't make a tip reliable.

   The prosecution had argued for a firearms exception that would make stops based on anonymous tips regarding guns reasonable per se.  The court didn't like the slippery slope something like that would create, and talked about how if they were to humor that then eventually the exception would swallow the rule (because other kinds of criminals are known to carry guns, so anonymous tips not involving firearms could theoretically be treated like anonymous tips involving firearms...).  So the Supreme Court specifically did not create a rule that would allow us to stop people based on anonymous tips regarding firearms.

   The court did note that if the circumstances were different, such as if a case were to involve a suspect carrying a bomb, or if a case involved a place where the expectation of privacy is diminished (like an airport or school), then maybe it would be possible to justify a search using information that would otherwise be insufficient.  But there was nothing like that here, so the evidence in J.L.'s case was suppressed.