Before I summarize this opinion, let me just say that Rebecca Christie should go die in a fire. I say this as an avid video game enthusiast. To hell with her.
With that having been said... Rebecca Christie liked to play video games on her computer. She would begin her day at noon, play until three in the morning, and occasionally take a break to care for her three year old daughter. Her husband apparently provided some care to the child (not that he was father of the year or anything), but between the hours of 10 pm and whenever-Rebecca-could-be-bothered-to-wake-up, their daughter was shut in her bedroom, behind a door which she was incapable of opening, and unable to access food or water. Even when she wasn't locked up, she wasn't properly cared for (sometimes eating food that was left out for the cats since she didn't have enough for herself). Occasionally, Rebecca's ten year old stepdaughter would visit. She would one day go on to testify that Rebecca usually didn't feed them until noon, and that she would give some of her food to Rebecca's daughter because she was so obviously hungry.
Then one day, Mr. Christie was sent on a military deployment. Nine days later, Christie's daughter died of dehydration. An autopsy revealed no underlying medical causes: Rebecca Christie's three year old daughter died of being ignored. Dehydration is a pretty obvious and gruesome way to go. Christie didn't notice because she was too busy with World of Warcraft (even after finding her daughter near death, she was back on-line in an hour).
Since this happened on an Air Force base, the feds had jurisdiction. At some point during the investigation, they seized Christie's computer (her husband consented to the seizure, and she didn't object). Then the lead investigator got drawn into another investigation for five month, and nothing was done with this case (I'm not sure what he was investigating, but the court acknowledges that it was a higher priority than this case). When he was freed up from his other cases, he applied for a search warrant for the computer. During the interim, Christie had requested copies of some of the documents that were on her computer, and he had refused to provide her with them. She never objected to him hanging onto the computer itself, though.
The search warrant was granted, which revealed some incriminating information. The investigator applied for another search warrant, which would authorize a more thorough search of the computer. This was granted, too, and more incriminating evidence was obtained.
Christie was eventually charged with (and convicted of) second degree murder. That charge was under a federal statue, but she was also convicted of a couple of "assimilated" crimes (which are basically state crimes charged in federal court. Until I read this decision, I didn't know that the feds could do that).
Christie appealed her conviction for a variety of reasons, but only a couple of them are relevant to this blog. First, she argued that the five month delay between the seizure of her computer and the application for the warrant rendered the search unreasonable (she had a similar argument for the second warrant). Second, she argued that the warrant wasn't specific enough.
Regarding her first argument: the Tenth circuit recognized that a delay in searching seized property can be unreasonable. If the government seizes something that might have evidentiary value, but then a search reveals nothing incriminating about the seized item, then the property should be returned to its rightful owner. So depriving Christie of her property for five months before even finding out whether or not it was evidence could certainly be unreasonable. The thing is that the seizure of the computer was based on consent from someone with apparent authority to give consent, and Christie never actually objected to it. During the five months, she never made any attempt to get the government to give her computer back, so she really doesn't have much to stand on there. On the other side of that disagreement, the government had a (somewhat) reasonable explanation for the delay in that the agent had more important things to do. The court made it clear that this isn't a blanket justification, and that this issue was only just barely decided in the government's favor. In general, when there's going to be a long delay like that the investigator should find someone else to apply for a warrant more expeditiously.
The delay in the second warrant wasn't such a big deal. By then, the investigator knew that the computer contained incriminating evidence. A person does have the right to have their property returned to them even if it's evidence, but not until after the trial. So he could take all the time he wanted to apply for the second warrant.
Regarding her second argument: search warrants have to particularly describe the place to be searched and the thing to be seized. Searches should be tailored to the facts that justify them, and search warrants are never supposed to be a license for general rummaging by law enforcement. The warrant in this case authorized a search for:
[a]ll records and information relating to the murder, neglect, and abuse of
[BW] from June 19, 2002 (date of birth) to May 4, 2006, (date computer
seized), including:
1. All photographs of [BW].
2. All correspondence and/or documents relating to [BW].
3. All records and information, including any diaries or calendars,
showing the day-to-day activities of Rebecca Christie and/or [BW].
4. All addresses and/or contact information of friends, families, or
acquaintances who may have had regular contact with Rebecca
Christie and/or [BW].
Christie's argument is that provision 3 authorized general rummaging, and that for this reason the warrant was invalid and the evidence should be suppressed. The government argues that all of the numbered provisions were modified by the heading, which limited the search to information relating the the murder, neglect, and abuse of Christie's daughter. Christie's argument was that the government should specify exactly how they would search the computer for this information, but the government countered that this wouldn't be practical. There's logistically no way for them to know exactly where in the computer they're going to need to look for this information or what protocols they'll use to find it. Computers can be tricky places to search, what with the potential for deceptive file names, hiding stuff in weird directories, and whatnot.
The court held that the heading met the specificity requirement. Further, the issue of how a search is conducted isn't something that has to be brought up at the warrant application stage. Even a search with a warrant can be unreasonable if the way that the search is executed is unreasonable, but that's a question to be brought up in court after the fact, rather than expecting an investigator to know exactly where' he'll find evidence before he looks for it.
All of Christie's arguments failed, and her conviction was upheld.
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