Decision here.
There's some pretty interesting discussion in this case, I suggest reading the decision itself rather than just my summary. But for those of you who lack either the time or the inclination...
Ofc. McEachern conducted a wall stop of Cash's car. He had been informed by narcotics officers that Cash's car had been seen at a drug house and directed to stop it, but the actual justification for the stop was that Cash ran a stop sign. During the stop, Cash said that he was on his way to take a drug test for Ofc. Brittingham, who was a federal probation officer. McEachern saw a device in the front seat which was made from a bladder, a tube, and a clamp on the end of the tube. He recognized it as a device used for defeating urinalysis. McEachern called for Brittingham to come out to the traffic stop. He got there about 20 minutes after the initial stop.
While he was standing outside of the car, Brittingham noticed a gun in Cash's back seat. One thing led to another, and Cash got his ass kicked while resisting arrest, but nobody was seriously hurt. The officers inventoried Cash's car (while Cash was in the back seat of one of theirs), and found a bunch of meth and needles and whatnot. As they were doing their search, Cash asked to speak with Brittingham. Brittingham asked him "What's up?" and Cash responded with "You've got to help me, they're going to kill me." Brittingham asked "What's the deal?" and Cash explained that he had been dealing drugs, and messing with some really bad people, and that they were going to kill him. Cash was not advised of his Miranda rights at any point during all of this.
In court, Cash moved to suppress the physical evidence as the fruit of an illegal detention, and moved to suppress his statements as being taken in violation of Miranda and as being involuntary. Motion denied, and he was convicted after a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the lower court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
The Tenth affirmed. This decision touches on three important issues: the reasonableness of the detention, Miranda, and the voluntariness of Cash's statements.
First, the detention: Obviously, since Cash ran a stop sign the initial stop was justified. But every stop needs to be limited in scope and duration to the circumstances which justify it, unless one of two things occurs: 1- additional facts justify extending the stop, or 2- the stop becomes a consensual encounter. In this case, the presence of a device for defeating drug tests along with Cash's statement that he was on his way to take a drug test for a federal probation officer combined to establish reasonable suspicion. Why he left something like that in plain view on the passenger seat, I can not say. Most likely because he is stupid.
Second, Miranda. As we all (should) know, the need for Miranda warnings is triggered by custodial interrogation. I've gone on rants about people needing to understand that "custody" prong of custodial interrogation, but there are just as many of us who have trouble understanding what is and is not "interrogation."
Interrogation (for Miranda purposes) is"words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." So booking questions are not interrogation, but neither are neutral responses to a suspect's questions. In this case, saying "What's up?" was a lot like asking "What did you want to talk to me about?" (which, as the court puts it, is a pretty far cry from "where were you on the night of the murder?"). It's a question, but there was no reason for Brittingham to believe that it would elicit incriminating information. The same goes for (under these circumstances) asking him "What's the deal?" was just a response to Cash's statement. It wasn't the sort of thing that was likely to elicit an incriminating response... even though that's exactly what it did.
It's worth noting that custodial interrogation is an objective test. That means that it doesn't matter whether the police intended for their questions to elicit an incriminating response. What matters is only whether they knew or should have known that their questions or actions were likely to elicit an incriminating response.
And that leaves voluntariness. Statements and confessions which are involuntarily given can't be used in court. It doesn't matter whether Miranda was read or not, it doesn't even matter whether a suspect was under arrest or not. Any statement involuntarily made can't be used against someone in court. To clarify, "involuntary" means that the statement is the result of undue police coercion. That can take the form of false offers of leniency, excessively lengthy detentions, or beating a confession out of someone. That last option is what Cash tried to suggest happened here.
But the courts recognize that there's a difference between beating a confession out of somebody and injuring them while they are resisting arrest. Since the subsequent discussion between Cash and Brittingham didn't involve any additional violence, and since the violence was never directed towards making Cash talk (but rather towards lawfully taking him into custody), it did not render his statements involuntary.
The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, and Cash's conviction stands.
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