US Supreme Court New York v. Burger 86-80

Decided June 19, 1987

   Burger was the proprietor of an auto salvage yard (which he was operating without a license).  Police showed up to conduct an inspection of his business records and inventory, pursuant to a New York statute that allowed them to do random inspections on auto salvage yards.  He didn't have any business records to show them, but he did have inventory, which was stolen.  He was charged with possession of stolen property and with operating his junkyard without a license.

   Burger moved to suppress the evidence because the police searched his yard without a warrant.

   The US Supreme Court held that certain industries have a history of pervasive regulation by the government, to the extent that it diminishes their expectation of privacy.  They key question in identifying these industries isn't so much the length of time that they have been so regulated (although that is an factor), it's the depth and pervasiveness of the government oversight.  The industries mentioned in the decision include alcohol, firearms, mines, and junkyards.

   In order for the pervasive regulation of an industry to make search warrants (and even probable cause) unnecessary, a few requirements have to be satisfied:  First, there must be a substantial government interest in regulating the industry (in this case, it's the deterrence of auto theft by eliminating fences).  Second, warrantless inspections have to be necessary to further the regulative scheme (in this case, the court noted that stolen cars move quickly through junkyards, and that frequent unnanounced inspections are necessary to deter this).  Third, the regulatory scheme has to provide a constitutionally acceptable substitute for a warrant.  This means there has to be some sort of regulation which defines the scope of the search and puts the business owner on notice that the business is subject to searches (in this case, the statute itself was held to be a constitutionally acceptable substitute).

   The suppression order entered by a lower court was reversed.

Colorado Supreme Court People v. Unruh 84SA299

Decided 1-21-86.

   A police officer drove past three guys who were attempting to conceal something large and heavy in the trunk of a car.  When he came back, the car was abandoned, and the object in question turned out to be a safe.  One of the suspects was apprehended, and admitted to burglarizing a nearby house.  This suspect also claimed that the safe contained cash and drugs.  Another detective found a house nearby that appeared to have been broken into (the door had been broken open).  Officers searched the house, and found drug paraphernalia.  Unruh came home confirmed that his safe was stolen, and was informed that it had been taken to the police station and that he could get it in a day or so.

   While the safe was still at the station, officers had a K9 sniff the exterior of the safe.  The K9 alerted, indicating the presence of drugs.  Police obtained a search warrant, and found a lot of cocaine and marijuana in the safe.  Unruh was charged and convicted, and appealed his conviction on the grounds that evidence against him should have been suppressed.

   The Colorado Supreme Court recognized that other courts had already held that a dog sniff was not a search under the fourth amendment, but decided to afford greater protection against searches under the Colorado Constitition.  So the court ruled that a dog sniff was in fact a search, but that because of the minimal intrusion involved, it could be justified on the basis of reasonable suspicion.  Unruh also argued for suppression on the basis that the search of his house was unreasonable.  The court held that the search of his house was valid under the emergency exception (police officers may enter private property without a warrant where there is a reasonable belief that the premises have been or are being burglarized in order to secure the premises and to search for suspects and victims), and that although impermissibly expanded the search beyond the scope of the exception (they looked in dresser drawers, apparently they were looking for very small suspects), the paraphernalia was found in a place where they had authority to search.  So the warrant was good, and the conviction was upheld.

US Supreme Court Tennessee v. Garner 471

Decided March 27, 1985

   Police responded to a call of a burglary in progress, and found the suspect (Garner) fleeing from the house.  The officer attempting to stop Garner could see that he was 17 or 18, and appeared to be unarmed.  He identified himself as an officer and ordered Garner to stop.  Garner instead continued to flee, and began climbing over a fence.  In order to prevent him from escaping, the officer shot him in the back of the head.  He died, and was found to have stolen $10 and a purse during the burglary.

   The officer was acting under the authority of a state statute which authorized the use of any necessary force to effect an arrest (although most police departments of the time had policies that would have prohibited this use of force, this particular department did not).  The state argued in this case that the reasonableness of a seizure depends only on the facts justifying it, and not on how the seizure is actually carried out.  The court held that "to determine the constitutionality of a seizure we must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."

   The court also explored the justifications for the old common law rule that allowed deadly force to be used to apprehend a fleeing felon, but that rule came from a time when most felonies were punishable by death, and when the use of deadly force generally involved  closer combat and therefore was justified in part by the risk to the officer.  None of those justifications were found to be appropriate for the modern world, where many felonies are less violent and dangerous than some misdemeanors.

   The court ruled that "whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that person.  While it is not always clear just when minimal police interference becomes a seizure, there can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment," and that "where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given."

   Obviously, under the facts of this case, the use of deadly force was unreasonable.

US Supreme Court Oregon v. Elstad 83-773

Decided March 4, 1985.

   Police obtained a warrant for Elstad's arrest after a witness reported seeing him burglarize someone's home (Elstad was 18).  The police went to his house, where his mother showed them to his room.  One officer then stayed with Elstad while another went with his mother to another room to inform her of the warrant for his arrest.  The officer who stayed with Elstad informed him that he believed he had been there for the burglary, and Elstad admitted that he had been.

   Elstad was arrested and taken to the station, where he waived his Miranda rights and confessed.  At trial, he sought to suppress his confession.  He argued that his confession was the fruit of the poisonous tree, being tainted by his earlier unwarned statement that he had been there.  The court had none of it, he was convicted, and he appealed.  The court of appeals took Elstad's side and reversed his conviction.  The prosecution appealed.

   The US Supreme Court ordered Elstad's conviction reinstated.  Here's why: Miranda warnings (like the exclusionary rule) are not actually required by the Constitution.  They are a judicially created measure designed to protect a constitutional right.  Where a Miranda violation has occurred, a suspect's statements will be presumed to be involuntary and suppressed, but if the statements were not actually made as the result of coercive police conduct the 5th Amendment isn't actually being violated so the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine doesn't apply.  In this case, the prosecution had already conceded that Elstad was in custody at the time of his first incriminating statement (I don't think they should've conceded that.  If they had argued the point, then I think they would have won this case on those grounds), so the Court accepted that conclusion.  But even without Miranda warnings, the Court held that the statement was obviously voluntary.  It was made in Elbert's home (hardly a police dominated atmosphere), there was no show of force or other coercive police conduct, it was made in response to an off-hand comment rather than after extensive interrogation.  Obviously voluntary.  Since the prosecution conceded the issue of custody, and since there was no Miranda warning given, the statement was inadmissible in court, but since the statement was not coerced there was no actual violation of Elstad's rights.

   If Elstad's rights had been violated, then the second confession could have been admissible anyway if there was a sufficient break in the causal chain between his earlier statement and his later one.  But since his rights weren't violated, no break in the causal chain was necessary.  All that was necessary was that his second statement also be voluntary (and, of course, made after a Miranda waiver).  Since that requirement was met, the statement should not have been suppressed.

Colorado Supreme Court People v. Berow 83SA498 83SA506

Decided October 9, 1984.

   Berow and her husband lived in a hotel, and went on a vacation to California.  Before leaving, they asked the manager to watch their room and "arrest any intruders."  While they were gone, the manager found the door had been tampered with and thought he saw someone inside.  He called the cops.  Even though the door had been tampered with, it was apparently still secured from inside by a chain lock.  Believing that a burglary was in progress, the officer forced entry.

   No one was found inside, but while searching only in areas where a person could hide the officer found a hash pipe and some marijuana plants.  He left the apartment, got a search warrant, returned and seized the evidence.  The trial court suppressed the evidence and the people appealed.

   The Colorado Supreme Court held that the apparent in-progress burglary constituted exigent circumstances justifying the officer's entry, and that additionally the hotel manager had apparently been given authority to consent to the officer's entry.  Once inside, the officer found the items in plain view and did not deviate from the original purpose of the search until he had obtained a warrant.  The order suppressing the evidence was reversed.

US Supreme Court US v. Leon 82-1771

Decided July 5, 1984

   An untested confidential informant made some allegations against some people, the cops investigated at great length, and eventually applied for a search warrant for three houses.  The warrant application was reviewed by several deputy district attorneys before making its way to the magistrate, who found that there was probable cause.  The warrant was issued, and evidence obtained from the searches led to several arrests (including Leon's) for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine.

   The defendants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause.  The trial court held that this was a close case, and that the investigating officer had acted in good faith in his investigation, but that the affidavit did not contain sufficient information and the warrant should not have been issued.  Accordingly, the evidence was suppressed.  The people appealed.

   The case gets more interesting when the court discusses the exclusionary rule.  Essentially, the exclusionary says that if evidence is obtained as the result of unlawful police conduct, then that evidence may not be introduced in the prosecution's case in chief (the evidence can still be used for other purposes, such as for cross-examining the defendant and for testimony in front of a grand jury).  And there's nothing in the Constitution which guarantees the suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence; the fourth amendment establishes the people's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, but it doesn't say anything about what should happen with evidence that is obtained when that right is violated.  The exclusionary rule was a sanction created by the courts to ensure that law enforcement would not systemically violate people's rights.

   That's a key point: the exclusionary rule doesn't exist to vindicate someone's rights (that's what lawsuits are for).  The exclusionary rule exists to discourage police misconduct, and so it should only be applied in circumstances where it will actually accomplish that goal.  In a case like this one, the police had already done everything they could to comply with the law.  They sought the guidance of a neutral magistrate by applying for a search warrant, and they were entitled to rely on the magistrate's judgment.  When the police are acting in good faith reliance on a search warrant they believe to be valid, but that warrant is later found to be invalid for some reason, the evidence is still admissible.  And so the good faith exception was born.

   Of course, this exception won't save a warrant that obtained by presenting faulty information to a judge when the officers knew or should have known that the information was false.  It also won't help if the warrant is obviously invalid (such as warrants that don't particularly describe the place to be searched or the item to be seized), warrants that are based on affidavits obviously devoid of probable cause, or "rubber stamped " warrants (meaning warrants issued by a judges who will grant anything just because the cops asked for it).

US Supreme Court New York v. Quarles 82-1213

Decided June 12, 1984

   This decision created the well-known public safety exception to Miranda.

   A couple of cops were approached by a woman who claimed that she had just been raped by a man with a gun.  She described the suspect, and said that he had gone to a particular supermarket.  The cops went to that store, where the found Quarles (who matched the suspect description).

   As soon as he saw the cops, Quarles took off running.  They chased, lost sight of him briefly, but caught him a moment later.  He was held at gunpoint, handcuffed, and searched, and there were at least four cops present.  He was in possession of an empty shoulder holster.

   One of the cops asked Quarles "Where's the gun?"  Quarles nodded to some boxes and told him the gun was over there.  After recovering the gun, the officer read Quarles the Miranda warnings.  Quarles waived his rights, and made some additional incriminating statements.

   The trial court suppressed the gun and Quarles' statements, reasoning that all of that evidence was tainted by the officer's failure to read Miranda before asking Quarles where the gun was.  The prosecution appealed all the way to the US Supreme Court.

   The Court explained that the Miranda warnings aren't actually constitutional rights themselves, but court-created procedural safeguards which protect the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination.  At the time that the court had created this safeguard, it accepted that requiring officers to Mirandize suspects would result in fewer convictions.  But this situation is different: the gun which was discarded somewhere in the store posed a safety risk.  The court held that unlike the risk of a later acquittal, a present risk of physical harm is more important than the procedural safeguard of Miranda warnings.  The court also noted that Quarles' incriminating statements weren't obtained by the sort of coercion that Miranda was intented to prevent.  So the court created a narrow exception to Miranda, allowing unwarned statements in circumstances like these to be used as evidence by the prosecution (as long as those statements are the result of the sort of questioning which is necessary to address a safety risk).