Colorado Supreme Court People v. Webb 14SA37

Decision here.

   Webb's adult son lived with her while he was on parole.  During a home visit from the parole officer and a cop, spoons with meth residue were found under his bed and he was determined to be under the influence of meth (as was a guest, who was in possession of syringes that tested positive for meth).  So the cops seized the paraphernalia and then got a warrant to search the house for more.

   At the beginning of the next search, they told Webb that she could leave if they wanted.  She chose to leave, and wanted to take her purse with her.  An officer went into her unlocked bedroom with her to retrieve the purse, and told her they were going to have to search it before she left with it.  A search of the purse revealed straws with meth residue.  More meth paraphernalia (with residue) was found elsewhere in her room.

   Webb was charged with possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.  She moved to suppress the evidence found in her bedroom.  The trial court accepted that the search of the bedroom was reasonable, but held that because she had a heightened expectation of privacy in her purse the search of the purse was unreasonable.  The People filed an interlocutory appeal.

   The Colorado Supreme Court held that the search of the purse was reasonable, but they used a couple of different rationales to get there.  On one hand, they pointed out that once a warrant has been obtained, the scope of a search is defined by the scope of the warrant rather than by any person's expectation of privacy.

   The court also discussed the actual parameters of a search of a house pursuant to a warrant (this is the part that threw me, I thought the other explanation was much easier to grasp).  Basically, if the police have a warrant for a house then they can search any areas of the house which the suspect (defined as the person whose actions gave rise to the probable cause justifying the search) has the ability to access.  Since Webb's bedroom was not locked, her son would have had the ability to access it (to include her purse).  And since the purse was capable of hiding the contraband named in the warrant, the search of the purse was valid.

   The suppression order was reversed and the case was sent back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Tenth Circuit US v. Garcia 13-2155

Decision here.

   Garcia was a passenger in a car that Ofc. Devos was towing.  He was towing because the windshield was too badly cracked for it to be safely driven (hence the traffic stop in the first place), and the driver was under arrest for driving on a suspended license (and for giving Devos a fake name, although the name he gave also came back to a suspended license).

   Garcia and Devos knew each other.  Devos knew that Garcia was a drug user with a conviction for armed robbery.  Two weeks ago, Devos had chased Garcia down an alley on foot while trying to arrest him for a warrant.  At the end of that chase, Garcia had turned to confront Devos with his fists up, and Devos had tased Garcia.

   The current traffic stop was taking place during the night on a road in the middle of nowhere, and there was no other officer available to assist Devos.  In light of all of the above, he decided to search Garcia before turning his back on him for the inventory.  During the search, he found a handgun magazine.  He handcuffed Garcia, had him sit on the curb, and then released him after the inventory.  Later, he arrested him for being a felon in possession of a weapon (based on the magazine).

   Garcia moved to suppress, arguing that the pat down was unjustified.  The Tenth Circuit held that under the totality of the circumstances, Devos had reason to believe that Garcia was dangerous and that he had the ability (based on his criminal history) to procure a weapons.  So the search was upheld.

   There's a dissenting opinion that would have suppressed the search, holding that Devos knew Garcia was dangerous but didn't have reason to believe that he was armed.  The majority opinion criticizes the dissent for isolating the
"armed" and "dangerous" prongs of the test from each other, and for ignoring the effect that one prong can have on the other (meaning that an officer's knowledge that someone is dangerous may suggest to them that that person is armed, or vice versa).  

   From a law enforcement perspective, it's obvious that Devos did the right thing.  I'm not interested in turning my back on someone who tried to fight me a couple weeks ago without first searching and cuffing him, either.  But the fact that this opinion had a dissent does show the importance of being able to properly explain our actions, and also shows that even something as entrenched as a Terry search could get screwed up tomorrow.

US Supreme Court Tolan v. Cotton 13-551

Decision here.

   Tolan and his cousin were driving to Tolan's house in a black Nissan.  As they got out of the car, an officer cleared the plate through NCIC.  Or he thought he did... he actually had a typo in the plate number.

   The incorrect plate number came back to a stolen vehicle of the same make and model.  And what happened next was a MESS.  Tolan and his cousin were given orders at gunpoint to get on the ground, more officers responded to assist, Tolan's parents came out of the house to voice their objection (calling out to the officers with hands up, saying that Tolan was their son, that was their car, the car wasn't stolen, etc..).  Basically a high-risk stop gone bad because of a lot of interference and limited compliance.

   Tolan's mother didn't comply with instructions to stand by the garage door, so Sgt. Cotton physically moved her out of the way.  There's conflicting testimony as to how much force he actually used, but the worst version says that he shoved her against the door hard enough to leave bruises.  Then Tolan got to his feet (or to his knees, depending on who you believe) while telling Cotton "get your fucking hands off my mom."

   Then Cotton shot Tolan.  Because we don't do less lethal force in Texas?  I don't know, but Tolan survived (with a life-altering injury).  Cotton was indicted for (and later acquitted of) aggravated assault by a public servant.  Tolan & family sued.

   The trial court and the Fifth circuit each held that Cotton was entitled to qualified immunity.  The trial court held that the force used was reasonable, and the Fifth held that whether or not the force used was reasonable, Cotton did not violate any of Tolan's clearly established rights.  I haven't read those decisions, so I can't speak to how they arrived at those conclusions.

   The US Supreme Court held that the Fifth circuit did not view the facts in the light most favorable to Tolan, the plaintiff (which the courts are required to do when deciding whether or not to grant qualified immunity).  Expressing no opinion of the reasonableness of Cotton's actions, SCOTUS simply vacated the decision of the lower court and sent it back for them to decide again using the correct standard.

Colorado Supreme Court People v. Knedler 13SA292

Decision here.

   Knedler sometimes lived under a bridge with two other people, perhaps because the money that might have otherwise paid for a home was going towards alcohol (by his own statements, he drank about a case plus a pint of alcohol every day).  One day Knedler beat the crap out of his, uh... roommates with a stick.  He was arrested later, whilst drinking at a hair salon where he also lives sometimes.

   Couldn't have been a very upscale salon...

   Anyway, Knedler agreed to speak to investigators, but didn't want to talk in the police car.  The took him to headquarters and advised him of his rights.  He initialed every line of the waiver, said that he knew his rights, and went on to confess.  After his interrogation, the jail nurse gave him a breath test which registered a BAC of .284.  However, she noted that he was alert and oriented.

   At trial, Knedler moved to suppress his confession.  His argument was that the Miranda waiver was invalid because of his extremely high BAC.  The trial court agreed and suppressed the confession, and the people filed an interlocutory appeal.

   The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that simply having a high BAC doesn't render a waiver invalid.  The question is whether a waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary (knowing and intelligent mean that the waiver is made with full understanding of the right in question and of the consequences of abandoning it.  Voluntary means that the waiver is free from governmental coercion).  These questions require the court to focus not on what a breathalyzer says, but on what the facts show regarding the defendant's cognitive ability.  Someone who is lucid and rational can validly waive their rights no matter what their actual BAC is.

   The court described some of the factors used to weigh the ability of an intoxicated person to waive his rights as: 1- whether the defendant was oriented to his or her surroundings and situation; 2- whether the defendant's answers were the responsive product of a rational thought process; 3- whether the defendant was able to appreciate the seriousness of his or her situation and the possibility of incarceration; 4- whether the defendant had the foresight to attempt to deceive the police to avoid prosecution; 5- whether the defendant expressed remorse for his or her actions; and 6- whether the defendant expressly stated that he or she understood his or her rights.

   The court also listed the following factors which are used more generally to decide whether a defendant's waiver is knowing and intelligent: 1- the length of time between the initial Miranda advisement and the interrogation; 2- whether the defendant or the interrogating officer initiated the interview; 3- whether and to what extent the interrogating officer reminded the defendant of his or her rights before the interrogation; 4- the clarity and form of the defendant's acknowledgment and waiver; 5- the defendant's background and experience with the criminal justice system; and 6- any language barriers and the defendant's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence.

   Most of those factors weighed heavily in the prosecution's favor, and the court recognized (as it has repeatedly) that there's a wide individual variation in people's ability to function after heavy drinking.  Knedler's waiver was held to be valid, and this case was send back to the trial court.

Colorado Court of Appeals People v. Richardson 10CA2488

Decision here.

   Richardson (hereinafter referred to as creepy MF) had a penchant for going down on his great-grand-nephew.  Who was 11.  Gross.

   Anyway, after the great-grand-nephew let his parents know what was going on, they went to the police.  The police staged a pretext phone call, where the great-grand-nephew confronted Richardson (AKA creepy MF) while they recorded the conversation.  Richardson implicitly acknowledged the accusations, and shortly afterwards found himself under arrest.  After signing a Miranda waiver, he admitted to... you know.  

   Richardson was convicted, and appealed.  His arguments were:

1- The phone call should have been suppressed.  Although he acknowledged that the police can record phone calls if one party consents, and although he acknowledged that his great-grand-nephew consented, he argued that his great-grand-nephew was a juvenile and therefore could not validly consent without a parent's presence or written permission.  Much like is the case in Colorado with custodial interrogation of a juvenile.  Unfortunately for creepy MF (but fortunately for justice and everyone else), the court recognized that consenting to the recording of a phone call for the purpose of arresting the pedophile SOB who victimized you is in no way similar to consenting to an interrogation for the purpose of getting your own ass in trouble.  So the recorded phone call was admissible in court.

2- He attempted to invoke his Miranda rights prior to signing the waiver.  And by "attempted to invoke," he means that he said "I'm not gonna spill my guts or anything."  Obviously, this is not an unequivocal invocation of ones right to counsel or to remain silent.  Hell, this isn't even a hint at either of those.  And so this argument also fails.

   Creepy MF's conviction was affirmed.

Colorado Court of Appeals People v. Dutton 11CA1456

Decision here.

   Dutton was an HTO who drove recklessly to avoid a traffic stop whilst driving in a car that he may or may not have owned (he was in the middle of a civil dispute over it).  Later, he would speak via phone to the officer who tried stop him and say some things that he would live to regret at the trial.  That same officer also picked Dutton out of a photo lineup as the driver.

   Whoever heard of showing a cop a photo lineup?  

   Anyway, Dutton appealed his conviction.  He argued that testimony about the phone call should not have been admitted as evidence because it was insufficiently substantiated as coming from him.  The rule in these things is that when a caller identifies themselves as a certain person, and this identification is supported by circumstantial evidence (such as the timing of the call, or the caller knowing things about the case that the suspect would know), then that's good enough to get the phone call admitted at trial and then the jury can decide if they think the call was legit.  So the call was admitted.

   Dutton also argued that the evidence wasn't enough to show that he was driving recklessly.  The court of appeals ruled that even though the pursuit only lasted a couple of blocks, the multiple traffic violations and the fact that he almost hit a pedestrian were enough to support the elements of reckless driving.  Anyone surprised by this?

   Convictions affirmed.

US Supreme Court Prado Navarette v. California 12-9490

Decision here.

   Lorenzo Prado Navarette & Jose Prado Navarette were driving down the highway when an anonymous RP called and said that they had run her off the road.  She gave their location, vehicle description, direction of travel, and license plate.  15 minutes later, a highway patrolman found them a few miles down the road.  He made a u-turn and pulled them over five minutes after that.  The police never observed any bad driving.

   When the officers approached the truck, they smelled marijuana.  There was 30 lbs in the truck bed.  After being convicted of transporting marijuana, the Prado Navarettes appealed.

   They argued that the stop was made without reasonable suspicion because the RP was anonymous.  The Supreme Court compared this case to Florida v. JL and Alabama v. White, both of which involved anonymous RPs.  In JL, someone called to say that a kid standing at a bus stop had a gun.  JL was contacted and searched, and had a gun.  The court would rule that the stop was made without reasonable suspicion because there was no reason to believe the anonymous tip was reliable.  In White, an anonymous RP called and said that a woman was going to drive a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken taillight from a particular apartment to a particular motel, and that she would be carrying cocaine.  She was stopped, searched, and had cocaine.  The court would rule that this tip was more reliable because the RP obviously had a special familiarity with the woman's affairs, implying that they had access to information about her illegal activities.

   In this case, the court ruled that because the RP called in and reported something which they had apparently just witnessed, and gave an accurate description of the suspect vehicle which was found just down the road shortly afterwards, and called in on a recorded 911 line (which also means that the police would have had access to her phone number and approximate location), this tip was sufficiently reliable to establish reasonable suspicion.  The court acknowledged that this was a close call (in fact, four out of nine Justices disagreed with it and would have suppressed the evidence), but the stop was held to be valid.  The Prado Navarettes' convictions were affirmed.