US Supreme Court Rodriguez v. US 13-9927

Decided 4-21-15

   Rodriguez was driving on a Nebraska highway when he was stopped by police for drifting out of his lane.  During the traffic stop, the officer checked both Rodriguez and his passenger for warrants, asked them questions about their travel plans and eventually gave Rodriguez a written warning for the traffic violation.  He then asked Rodriguez for permission to run a drug dog on the outside of the car.  Rodriguez refused.

   The officer instructed Rodriguez to shut off the car and wait by the patrol car.  He did so.  When another officer arrived (7 or 8 minutes later), the officer ran the dog on the car.  During the second pass around the outside of the car, the dog alerted.  A subsequent search of the car revealed distribution amounts of meth.

   In court, Rodriguez moved to suppress the meth.  A magistrate heard testimony from the officer, and then ruled that although there had been no reasonable suspicion to detain Rodriguez once the traffic stop was concluded, the 7 or 8 additional minutes of detention were a de minimus intrusion and therefore permissible under the Fourth Amendment (I was shocked by that reasoning; it wouldn't have worked in Colorado.  But apparently the 8th Circuit was good with it).  Rodriguez appealed all the way up to the Supreme Court.

   The court held that the reasonableness of a stop (in terms of duration) depends on the time needed to handle the reason for which the stop was made.  In this case, a traffic violation.  The court has long recognized certain things as being an acceptable part of a traffic investigation (such as questioning the person stopped, checking insurance and registration, and checking a database for arrest warrants and license status).  The court views those things as serving the underlying purpose of the traffic stop.  Other things (like asking questions which aren't related to the stop, or like running a dog on the outside of the car) aren't specifically prohibited, but prolonging the stop beyond the amount of time required to address the reason for the stop is prohibited.*

   The Court emphasizes that it's not just a question of whether the additional detention occurs before or after the summons/warning is issued.  The amount of time the police have to handle a traffic stop is however long it reasonably takes them to handle a traffic stop, and you can't drag that out in order to address things outside the scope of the stop.**  The Court also emphasizes that an officer can't simply hurry through the traffic stop business and then use the time it normally would have taken to complete a traffic stop to detain someone for a drug sniff.  If you can work quickly to get through a traffic stop in half the time that it normally takes, then it only means that your traffic stops now take less time than they used to.

   Accordingly, the court ruled that the additional detention could not simply be ignored as a "de minimus" intrusion on Rodriguez's liberty.  Instead, that was a real detention, no longer justified by the traffic violation because the traffic violation had already been fully investigated and addressed by the written warning.  But that doesn't necessarly mean that the additional detention was unjustified.  The magistrate had held that there was not reasonable suspicion of drug activity, but the court of appeals never reviewed that part of the decision (since the court of appeals had agreed that the detention could be justified under the "just because" theory).  The case is remanded back to the court of appeals to review whether or not there was reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity at the time that the officer decided to detain Rodriguez.***

*Unless, of course, new information comes to light during the stop which justifies the additional detention.

**Again, unless something happens during the stop which creates reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

***Most of the justices who dissented from this opinion would have simply ruled that there was reasonable suspicion to justify the additional detention, based on details not mentioned in the majority opinion.  Things like the overwhelming air fresheners, the passenger's abnormal level of nervousness, and the strange explanation that Rodriguez gave for his late night travel.

   

Colorado Supreme Court People v. Ackerman 14SA358

April 20, 2015

   Ackerman ran from the cops on an ATV whilst drunk, and crashed.  He and his passenger both sustained serious injuries and were transported to different hospitals.  She was DOA.

   The agency handling the investigation apparently had some pretty convoluted protocols for handling cases like this.  They have an accident reconstructionist team (which makes sense), but in critical incidents they also handle an internal investigation (do make sure there's no police wrongdoing) at the same time as their criminal investigation, which is one of the dumbest things I've ever heard.  Their dumbass policies become an issue because of the trial court's findings.

   Anyway, the accident investigators sent some people to the scene, an officer to each of the hospitals where the involved parties went, and had someone writing an affidavit for a search warrant for Ackerman's blood.  Before the affidavit could be completed, the officer at the hospital with Ackerman learned that he as about to go into surgery.  The guy who was running the investigation made the decision to order a warrantless blood draw before the surgery, and then a warrant was obtained to get two more blood draws afterwards.

   Of course, Ackerman's BAC was well over the legal limit.  In court, he moved to suppress the results of the blood tests.  The trial court held that the reason the warrant wasn't obtained was because of a procedural breakdown in the investigation, and because of poor communication between the officers.  The first blood test was suppressed, but the two with a warrant were admitted.  The people filed an interlocutory appeal.

   The Colorado Supreme Court explained that involuntary blood draws are justified when four conditions are met: 1- There must be probable cause to arrest the defendant for an alcohol-related driving offense.  2- There must be a clear indication that the blood sample with be evidence of the defendant's intoxication (this is a gimme, since blood tests are well established to be extremely accurate in gauging intoxication).  3- Exigent circumstances much exist which make it impractical to obtain a warrant.  4- The test must be a reasonable one, conducted in a reasonable manner (another gimme, since medical professionals always handle the blood draw in accordance with their procedures).

   In this case, the trial court had ruled that there was probable cause, but only that there was no exigency.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that if the cops had known at the start of the investigation exactly when Ackerman would be in surgery and unavailable for a blood draw then this would have been the correct ruling.  However, the cops were already dealing with a complex and logistically challenging investigation (this must have been a small department...), were already trying to get a warrant, and then they learned at the last minute that Ackerman was about to go under the knife.  Under those circumstances (and without the 20/20 hindsight employed by the trial court), it was impractical to obtain a warrant for the first blood draw.

   The suppression order was reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Tenth Circuit US v. Paetsch 13-1169

4-8-15

   This is one of those "summaries" which is so long that you might want to just read the actual decision.  

   Paetsch robbed a bank with a handgun, while dressed in a beekeeper mask and dark clothing that covered him from head to toe.  The police had no suspect description, no vehicle description, and basically jack shit to go on.  Except that there was a GPS tracking device hidden in the money that Paetsch took.

   Dispatch was giving officers live updates of the location of the tracker, so they knew that it was probably in a car (since it was travelling at about 30-40 miles per hour).  About 15 minutes after the robbery, they knew that the tracker was in one of about 20 cars stopped in eastbound traffic, at a red light at a particular intersection.  With no immediate way to differentiate which of the cars held the suspect, the police blocked the intersection and detained them all.  Occupants of the car were ordered via PA system to put their hands up (or hold their hands out of the windows).

   Dispatch was only able to narrow the location of the tracker down to a 60 foot radius, so the cops were waiting for a handheld tracker that would allow them to the location down to one car.  It was supposed to get there in a half hour, but it wound up taking around three times that long because the deputy responsible for it dropped the ball (repeatedly.  First he forgot his office keys when he left his house, then his siren broke, and when he finally arrived he didn't remember how to work the device and had to call for someone who knew what he was doing).

   While they were waiting for the tracker, Paetsch kept looking around, shifting in his seat, and refused to keep his hands up (this was 29 minutes after the roadblock was set up).  He was removed from his car at gunpoint and handcuffed (so was the occupant of another car who was acting similarly suspicious).  Eventually everyone was taken out of their cars (this time just on general principle), and then a secondary sweep of the cars was done to make sure no one was hiding.  During that sweep, officers noticed a bank band in Paetsch's car.

   Paetsch was arrested about an hour and a half into the stop, after someone finally got the handheld tracking device to work and picked up a strong signal from his car.  Everyone else was still detained (for some reason) for another half hour, but then finally released.  Guns, a mask, and $20,000 were found in Paetsch's car.

   In court, Paetsch moved to suppress all the physical evidence and  some statements he made (which aren't described in the decision).  He argued that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment due to the lack of individualized reasonable suspicion.  The district court ruled against him (although it did suppress whatever his statements were, since he had asked for a lawyer).  Paetsch conditionally pled guilty, and then appealed.

   The Tenth circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court.  Paetsch was correct that at the inception of the stop there was no individualized reasonable suspicion, but the real touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not necessarily reasonable suspicion.  The court analyzed the reasonableness of the stop by balancing the gravity of public concern and the degree to which the seizure advanced public interest against the severity of interference with individual liberty.  In other words, they asked how important it was (they were trying to catch an armed robber), how effective it was (it worked), and balanced that against the impact on individual liberty (and this is where it gets even more interesting (if you're into this sort of thing (but you are reading a blog about it, so you must be))).  For the first 29 minutes, the court found that the mass detention was reasonable.  After that, because Paetsch (and one of the other mass detainees) was acting suspicious by refusing to keep his hands up and by fidgeting in his seat and looking around, the police had a reason to detain Paetsch in particular.  From that point on, the reasonableness of the mass detention is not an issue in this case, because Paetsch's detention was reasonable and because 4th Amendment rights are personal rights which can't be vicariously asserted (i.e. Paetsch can't assert the other detainees' rights, only his own).  Therefore, the court decided not to decide whether the mass detention was still reasonable (although I'd suspect that it was, just not for as long as it eventually went on.  After Paetsch was eventually arrested, they still held on to everyone else for another half hour).

   Obviously, once the officers saw the money band in Paetsch's car and especially once the tracker had been located in his car there was probable cause to arrest Paetsch and search his car.  Paetsch's conviction stands.

US Supreme Court Grady v. North Carolina 14-593

Decided 3-30-15.

   As a recidivist sex offender, Grady was court ordered to be subjected to satellite based monitoring for the rest of his life.  Basically, he would have to wear a monitor at all times, which would give the state continuous time-stamped information about his location, and alerts if he either wasn't somewhere he needed to be, or was somewhere he wasn't supposed to be.

   Grady appealed the decision requiring his monitoring all the way to the Supreme Court.  His argument was that if GPS monitoring of someone's car (as in US v. Jones) is a search, then GPS monitoring of their body is also a search.  North Carolina's arguments were pretty convoluted... first they held that because the program is civil in nature, this is not a search.  Then they argued that because Grady didn't present any evidence that the program obtains information, the courts have no way of knowing whether or not it's a search (both arguments seem almost inconceivably stupid to me).

   The Supreme Court held that GPS monitoring of a person is a search, using similar reasoning to what they did in Jones (the GPS monitoring device Grady would be required to wear is essentially a physical intrusion on his property).  It doesn't matter if it's a civil process or a criminal investigation... even home inspectors doing inspections are conducting a search which must comply with the Fourth Amendment.  It also doesn't matter that Grady didn't do enough to explain the program to the Supreme Court... it's goal of obtaining information is evident both from the name of the program (Satellite Based Monitoring) and from the statute authorizing it.

   On the other hand, just because it's a search doesn't mean it's an unreasonable search.  Since the state courts never addressed the reasonableness of it, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the State to consider whether or not the search is reasonable.  Kinda like telling them to stop skirting the issue, and make a proper decision.

Colorado Court of Appeals People v. Theus-Roberts 12CA0013

Decided 3-26-15

   Theus-Roberts took a cab to a bunch of different places, racking up a $90 fare.  At the end of his big night out, he could only pay $80.  He told the driver that his friend would be along shortly to give him the rest of his money.

   A few minutes later, Theus-Roberts came back, shot the driver in the chest, and took the $80 back.  He fled, the driver called the police, gave them his description, and Theus-Roberts was found hiding in a nearby garage.  An eyewitness identified him in a show-up (the driver survived, and identified Theus-Roberts at trial as the shooter).

   Theus-Roberts was convicted of exactly what you'd expect, but he appealed his conviction.  His argument is that the court should have suppressed the eyewitness identification because the show-up was unduly suggestive.

   The Court of Appeals explains that "A one-onone showup identification may be permissible and reasonable in situations where immediate identification would facilitate an ongoing criminal investigation.  The reasonableness of the showup procedure, however, must also be measured against the potential for irreparable misidentification."  The important question is whether any given show up was unreliable because of being unnecessarily and irreparably suggestive.  Relevant factors include the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the 4 crime, the witness's degree of attention, the accuracy of any prior description of the suspect, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.

   In this case, the witness lived across the street from the shooting, looked out her window after hearing the shooting, and described Theus-Roberts by race and by a bag he was carrying (and later found with).  An hour after the shooting, an officer told her that they may or may not have a suspect in custody, and that he wanted her to tell him whether or not someone was the same person she had seen near the cab.  A couple of officers removed Theus-Roberts from the ambulance, and the eyewitness immediately identified him with certainty.

   The trial court had correctly denied Theus-Roberts' motion to suppress the show up.  He had a few other arguments on appeal, but they're more relevant to prosecutors than to cops (and none of them had any merit).  His conviction is upheld.

Colorado Court of Appeals People v. Griego 10CA2609

Decided 3-26-15.

   The facts of this case would've been sufficient to convict Griego of his 7th and 8th DUI, which is what the police charged him with.  But the prosecution randomly decided to change the charges to attempted second degree assault and attempted manslaughter, arguing that by driving while he was drunk he was attempting to kill everyone in the area.

   ...sigh... I like the enthusiasm, but that's crazy.

   Somehow, they got a conviction on that theory.  Griego appealed, and the Court of Appeals held that the prosecution's theory was nonsense and remanded for acquittal on all counts.

Colorado Supreme Court People v. Munoz-Gutierrez 14SA187

Decision here.

   An officer working a drug interdiction assignment pulled Munoz-Gutierrez over for weaving across the fog line.  There was a bit of a language barrier, but they were able to communicate (especially after the arrival of another officer who spoke a little more Spanish, albeit not fluently).

   The cops did that thing where they give someone a warning, tell them they're free to go, and then ask them if they'd mind answering a few more questions.  They asked (in Spanish) if there was anything illegal in the car, and after Munoz-Gutierrez denied that they asked if they could search.  He gave consent (apparently through body language, the decision doesn't specify how).  They brought out a written consent form, but Munoz-Gutierrez's education wasn't really sufficient for him to understand it (although it was in Spanish), and he signed on the wrong line.

   They searched the car and found enough marijuana for it to be illegal even in Colorado.  Munoz-Gutierrez was arrested, but the trial court later found that his consent was invalid because the cops didn't explain to him beforehand that he had the right to refuse.  The people filed an interlocutory appeal.

   Before searching based solely on consent, C.R.S. 16-3-310 requires police officers in Colorado to explain to someone that they are being asked to voluntarily consent to a search and that they have the right to refuse.  It's not something we're required to recite verbatim, and failure to advise a person as required is only considered a factor in whether or not the consent was voluntary.

   In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the trial court incorrectly treated the lack of required advisement as fatal to the voluntariness of a search.  As far as the courts are concerned, the real question is whether the consent is due to unduly coercive conduct by the police which overbears the defendant's will.  Factors which the courts consider include: the age, education, and intelligence of the defendant; the duration, location, and circumstances of the search; the consenting person's state of mind; and anything else that could have affected the defendant's free and unconstrained choice in consenting to the search.

   In this case, the court held that although the police didn't give the proper advisement of Munoz-Gutierrez's right to refuse, and although that factored against them, they still didn't overbear his will.  The order suppressing the search was reversed, and this case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.