Decided December 9, 1975
Mosley was arrested by a Detroit PD detective who was investigating a couple of robberies. He given a Miranda advisement and he initially waived his rights, but after a few questions he said that he didn't want to talk about the robberies (he did not ask for a lawyer, he just said that he didn't want to talk about the robberies). The interrogation was promptly terminated.
A couple hours later, a homicide detective interrogated Mosley about a murder. The murder was entirely unrelated to the robberies, and the interrogation took place in a different location than the robbery interrogation had taken place. Prior to the interrogation, Mosley was again advised of his Miranda rights (which he again waived). Mosley made some incriminating statements, and was eventually convicted of murder. He appealed his conviction, arguing that his statements should have been suppressed under Miranda.
The US Supreme Court discussed the irrational extremes that would be possible under Miranda. On one hand, it Miranda could be applied so that once a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent, the police may never again custodially interrogate him for any reason, about any case, at any time in the future. And any statement made after the invocation of rights could be held to be a per-se violation of Miranda, even if the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and made a statement. On the opposite extreme, Miranda could be held to require that if a suspect invokes his rights then the police need only stop questioning for a moment, and then they may resume the very same interrogation. I'm not making any of this up, it's all discussed in the decision.
Obviously the Court didn't agree with any of the above possibilities. They held that the critical safeguard of Miranda is a suspect's right to "cut off questioning," and so the test for the admissibility of post-advisement statements is whether that right was scrupulously honored. The court also contrasted this case with a previous case from 1966 (Westover v. U.S.). In Westover, a suspect was interrogated for a couple hours by state LEOs without being advised of his rights. Then the feds took over, read him his rights, and he confessed. The court at that time held that the interrogation by federal officials benefited from the pressures of the previous illegal interrogation, and that the advisement was too little, too late. You can't interrogate someone, then read them Miranda, then use a subsequent waiver to rehabilitate (or continue) the earlier interrogation.
This case was not like that one; in this case, the US Supreme Court held that the Detroit PD scrupulously honored Mosley's request to cut off questioning. They didn't refuse to end the first interrogation and they didn't use repeated requested for new interrogations to wear down his resistance. They immediately ceased interrogation when he invoked his rights, and the second interrogation happened after a significant passage of time and a renewed Miranda waiver, and was limited to a crime entirely unrelated to the first interrogation. For these reasons, the Supreme Court held that Mosley's incriminating statements were admissible.
Monday, May 12, 1997
Thursday, April 3, 1997
US Supreme Court US v. Edwards 73-88
Decided March 26, 1974
Edwards was arrested for attempting to break into the post office, and some paint chips on his clothing were of evidentiary value. At the time he was arrested the police didn't have any clothes for him to wear, so they waited until the next morning (after they bought a shirt and pants) to seize his clothes as evidence. At his trial, he objected to the admission of his clothes as evidence, saying that their warrantless seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.
The US Supreme Court ruled that the ten hour delay between his arrest and the seizure of his clothing didn't matter, because he (and his clothing) had been in police custody the entire time. The court held under those circumstances, the police were entitled to seize the clothing with or without probable cause (it should be noted that this rested on the fact that the arrest was lawful, pursuant to probable cause).
The court didn't rule that a warrant would never be required when a suspect was already in custody, but it encapsulated its entire ruling with one sentence: "While the legal arrest of a person should not destroy the privacy of his premises, it does—for at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extent— take his own privacy out of the realm of protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and evidence."
Edwards was arrested for attempting to break into the post office, and some paint chips on his clothing were of evidentiary value. At the time he was arrested the police didn't have any clothes for him to wear, so they waited until the next morning (after they bought a shirt and pants) to seize his clothes as evidence. At his trial, he objected to the admission of his clothes as evidence, saying that their warrantless seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.
The US Supreme Court ruled that the ten hour delay between his arrest and the seizure of his clothing didn't matter, because he (and his clothing) had been in police custody the entire time. The court held under those circumstances, the police were entitled to seize the clothing with or without probable cause (it should be noted that this rested on the fact that the arrest was lawful, pursuant to probable cause).
The court didn't rule that a warrant would never be required when a suspect was already in custody, but it encapsulated its entire ruling with one sentence: "While the legal arrest of a person should not destroy the privacy of his premises, it does—for at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extent— take his own privacy out of the realm of protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and evidence."
Wednesday, March 12, 1997
US Supreme Court US v. Robinson 72-936
Decided December 11, 1973.
Officer Jenks stopped Robinson for driving on a revoked license (he knew his license was revoked froman investigation a few days earlier), and placed him under arrest. During a search incident to arrest, Jenks found heroin Robinson's pocket. Robinson was convicted, but the court of appeals reversed his conviction on the grounds that Jenks had no basis for believing that evidence of the offense charged (revoked license) would be found in a search. The court held that for this reason, the search incident to arrest should have been limited to a pat down for weapons (like a Terry search), and the heroin should have been supressed.
The prosecution appealed. The US Supreme Court held that in the case of a lawful arrest based on probable cause, the person has been seized and a full search of the person does not need any further justification. Although the preservation of evidence and the protection of the officer (particularly in light of the prolonged proximity with a suspect that accompanies a custodial arrest) are the underlying justifications for this exception to the warrant requirement, the court found that there was no need to actually articulate one of those reasons to make the search reasonable; the mere fact of the arrest does that. The court of appeals was reversed.
In light of this decision, Gant is all the more interesting. But the authority to search a person incident to arrest has generally been more stable than the search of the area surrounding the person. Besides, Gant was very much a case where law enforcement had it's card pulled by the court for trying to push our limits.
Officer Jenks stopped Robinson for driving on a revoked license (he knew his license was revoked froman investigation a few days earlier), and placed him under arrest. During a search incident to arrest, Jenks found heroin Robinson's pocket. Robinson was convicted, but the court of appeals reversed his conviction on the grounds that Jenks had no basis for believing that evidence of the offense charged (revoked license) would be found in a search. The court held that for this reason, the search incident to arrest should have been limited to a pat down for weapons (like a Terry search), and the heroin should have been supressed.
The prosecution appealed. The US Supreme Court held that in the case of a lawful arrest based on probable cause, the person has been seized and a full search of the person does not need any further justification. Although the preservation of evidence and the protection of the officer (particularly in light of the prolonged proximity with a suspect that accompanies a custodial arrest) are the underlying justifications for this exception to the warrant requirement, the court found that there was no need to actually articulate one of those reasons to make the search reasonable; the mere fact of the arrest does that. The court of appeals was reversed.
In light of this decision, Gant is all the more interesting. But the authority to search a person incident to arrest has generally been more stable than the search of the area surrounding the person. Besides, Gant was very much a case where law enforcement had it's card pulled by the court for trying to push our limits.
Thursday, March 6, 1997
US Supreme Court Cady v. Drombrowski 72-5864
Decided 6-21-73.
Drombowski was a Chicago police officer who was involved in a single car DUI accident in a small town in Wisconsin. He was arrested (and later hospitalized... he wasn't so much drunk as he was completely shit faced), and his car (a rental) was towed to a private, unsecured garage and left outside. The arresting officers were under the impression that Chicago officers were required to carry their service revolvers at all times, but they hadn't been able to find it either on his person or in the glove box or passenger compartment of his car. This was an area of grave concern for the small town cops, as they were afraid that the revolver would fall into the wrong hands.
While one of the arresting officers stood guard over Drombowski in the hospital, the other went to the private garage to search for and secure the weapon. He searched the car a little more thoroughly this time, but he still didn't find a gun. Instead, he found blood-soaked clothes (including a police uniform), a bloody nightstick and flashlight, and similar evidence that something was not right. When Drombowski was eventually sober enough to answer questions about all of that, he lawyered up. Oddly, after talking to his lawyer, he directed police to a body in a dump on his brother's farm.
The police also noticed a lot of blood in another car near where the body was found (this was Drombowski's car, which had broken down right before he got the rental). All of this led to Drombowski being convicted of first degree murder. He appealed his conviction, on the grounds that everything should have been suppressed because the search of his rental car was unreasonable.
The Supreme Court noted that the officer who searched the car was ignorant of any murder, and wasn't looking for evidence of a crime at all (the police already had all the evidence they needed for a DUI, and the officer was attempting to retrieve a weapon for the sake of keeping it from being stolen). The court recognized that many of a police officer's duties are "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute," and labelled these duties as "community caretaking functions."
The court held that this search was reasonable as community caretaking, but didn't offer much guidance on the actual limits of community caretaking. The court did note that the fact that less intrusive means (like posting a guard at the rental car) might have also accomplished police's goals does not by itself make the search unreasonable. Drombowski's conviction was upheld.
Drombowski was a Chicago police officer who was involved in a single car DUI accident in a small town in Wisconsin. He was arrested (and later hospitalized... he wasn't so much drunk as he was completely shit faced), and his car (a rental) was towed to a private, unsecured garage and left outside. The arresting officers were under the impression that Chicago officers were required to carry their service revolvers at all times, but they hadn't been able to find it either on his person or in the glove box or passenger compartment of his car. This was an area of grave concern for the small town cops, as they were afraid that the revolver would fall into the wrong hands.
While one of the arresting officers stood guard over Drombowski in the hospital, the other went to the private garage to search for and secure the weapon. He searched the car a little more thoroughly this time, but he still didn't find a gun. Instead, he found blood-soaked clothes (including a police uniform), a bloody nightstick and flashlight, and similar evidence that something was not right. When Drombowski was eventually sober enough to answer questions about all of that, he lawyered up. Oddly, after talking to his lawyer, he directed police to a body in a dump on his brother's farm.
The police also noticed a lot of blood in another car near where the body was found (this was Drombowski's car, which had broken down right before he got the rental). All of this led to Drombowski being convicted of first degree murder. He appealed his conviction, on the grounds that everything should have been suppressed because the search of his rental car was unreasonable.
The Supreme Court noted that the officer who searched the car was ignorant of any murder, and wasn't looking for evidence of a crime at all (the police already had all the evidence they needed for a DUI, and the officer was attempting to retrieve a weapon for the sake of keeping it from being stolen). The court recognized that many of a police officer's duties are "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute," and labelled these duties as "community caretaking functions."
The court held that this search was reasonable as community caretaking, but didn't offer much guidance on the actual limits of community caretaking. The court did note that the fact that less intrusive means (like posting a guard at the rental car) might have also accomplished police's goals does not by itself make the search unreasonable. Drombowski's conviction was upheld.
Friday, January 10, 1997
Colorado Supreme Court Condon v. People 24554
Decided October 26, 1971.
Mr. Chance, a landlord, went to his rental property and decided to water the lawn. He went into the backyard to turn on the water, and noticed the smell of a dead body coming from a basement window. He called the police.
Three separate officers also noted the smell of a decomposing body coming from the basement window. They tried to enter the house using Mr. Chance's key, but it didn't work. They eventually broke into the house through the back door and searched for the dead body (they began their search on the top floor, then moved down to the main floor, including cupboards and cabinets and finding drugs and paraphernalia along the way. Eventually, they made their way to the basement. The court didn't seem to like the way the search was conducted). No body was ever found, but there were chemicals found which produced a similar smell and were used in the manufacture of mescaline. For some reason, now that all of this had been found, the police applied for a search warrant to search for the stuff they'd already found. A day late and a dollar short.
Mr. Chance's tenants were arrested a few days later.
The defendants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search was illegal. The people argued that the search was justified either as an administrative search in response to an emergency (the dead body), or alternately justified by Mr. Chance's consent.
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the smell of a decomposing body does not, by itself, justify warrantless entry. If the body is decomposing, then any emergency has obviously passed. It's too late to render aid, and they won't be any more dead in an hour or two. The court noted that there is some health risk to the community, but this isn't the kind of pressing emergency that justifies warrantless entry. The court noted that there was certainly probable cause in this case, but that there was plenty of time for the officers to go get a warrant to search for a dead body.
The People's consent argument wasn't going anywhere, either. The court pointed out that it was the defendants' Constitutional rights at stake, not Mr. Chance's, and therefore any waiver of those Constitutional rights had to come from the defendants and not Mr. Chance. A landlord may not consent to a warrantless search of his tenant's residence.
Finally, obtaining a warrant after the fact did nothing whatsoever to mitigate the fact that the whole search had been illegal. The evidence obtained from this search was suppressed.
Mr. Chance, a landlord, went to his rental property and decided to water the lawn. He went into the backyard to turn on the water, and noticed the smell of a dead body coming from a basement window. He called the police.
Three separate officers also noted the smell of a decomposing body coming from the basement window. They tried to enter the house using Mr. Chance's key, but it didn't work. They eventually broke into the house through the back door and searched for the dead body (they began their search on the top floor, then moved down to the main floor, including cupboards and cabinets and finding drugs and paraphernalia along the way. Eventually, they made their way to the basement. The court didn't seem to like the way the search was conducted). No body was ever found, but there were chemicals found which produced a similar smell and were used in the manufacture of mescaline. For some reason, now that all of this had been found, the police applied for a search warrant to search for the stuff they'd already found. A day late and a dollar short.
Mr. Chance's tenants were arrested a few days later.
The defendants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search was illegal. The people argued that the search was justified either as an administrative search in response to an emergency (the dead body), or alternately justified by Mr. Chance's consent.
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the smell of a decomposing body does not, by itself, justify warrantless entry. If the body is decomposing, then any emergency has obviously passed. It's too late to render aid, and they won't be any more dead in an hour or two. The court noted that there is some health risk to the community, but this isn't the kind of pressing emergency that justifies warrantless entry. The court noted that there was certainly probable cause in this case, but that there was plenty of time for the officers to go get a warrant to search for a dead body.
The People's consent argument wasn't going anywhere, either. The court pointed out that it was the defendants' Constitutional rights at stake, not Mr. Chance's, and therefore any waiver of those Constitutional rights had to come from the defendants and not Mr. Chance. A landlord may not consent to a warrantless search of his tenant's residence.
Finally, obtaining a warrant after the fact did nothing whatsoever to mitigate the fact that the whole search had been illegal. The evidence obtained from this search was suppressed.
Wednesday, January 8, 1997
US Supreme Court Whiteley v. Warden 136
3-29-71
This case establishes what has become known as the fellow officer rule (that an officer may rely on probable cause developed by a different officer when making an arrest).
It's an interesting case because, although it was good for law enforcement in general, it was decided against law enforcement in this particular case. Basically, some sheriff in Wyoming issued a bulletin stating that there was a warrant for Whiteley's arrest (and there was, although the complaint that the warrant was based on didn't actually contain enough information to establish PC). An officer in Laramie arrested Whitelely , acting on the aforementioned BOLO.
The Supreme Court held that although the officers who actually arrested Whiteley were entitled to rely on information form other officers that he was subject to arrest, the arrest itself was still invalid because the sheriff who claimed to have PC didn't.
Thursday, September 12, 1996
US Supreme Court Chimel v. California 770
Decided June 23, 1969
Officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant to arrest him for burglary. Chimel's wife allowed them into the house, where they waited for him to arrive. When he did, they arrested him and asked if they could look around. He objected, but they searched the entire house anyway, incident to his arrest. No search warrant was obtained. Evidence from the search was introduced at trial, and Chimel was convicted.
The Supreme Court overturned some of its own various precedents regarding search incident to arrest in this case holding that:
Officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant to arrest him for burglary. Chimel's wife allowed them into the house, where they waited for him to arrive. When he did, they arrested him and asked if they could look around. He objected, but they searched the entire house anyway, incident to his arrest. No search warrant was obtained. Evidence from the search was introduced at trial, and Chimel was convicted.
The Supreme Court overturned some of its own various precedents regarding search incident to arrest in this case holding that:
The evidence was suppressed, and Chimel's conviction overturned.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. The "adherence to judicial processes" mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less.
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