Decided March 27, 1979
At about 7 pm, an officer saw a car driving down the road. Since the officer wasn't doing anything, he decided to randomly stop the car to check for license and registration. He didn't observe any moving or equipment violations, and didn't have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. During the stop, he found weed in the car.
The US Supreme Court held that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment (go figure). The court recognized that the state has an interest in catching unlicensed drivers, but reasoned that this interest is adequately served by checking for license/insurance/registration on stops where there's some reason to stop the car. At the end of the decision, the court pointed out that it wasn't barring the use of checkpoints with this decision. The difference is that checkpoints "do not involve the unconstrained use of discretion."
Wednesday, September 3, 1997
Wednesday, July 16, 1997
US Supreme Court Pennsylvania v. Mimms 76-1830
Decided December 5, 1977
Mimms was stopped for driving with an expired license plate, and at the beginning of the traffic stop he was instructed to get out of the car. There were no particular facts on the record to justify that instruction, it was simply something that the officer chose to do. When Mimms got out of the car, the officer noticed a suspicious bulge in his clothing and searched him for weapons. The bulge was a gun, Mimms was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
He was convicted, but the conviction was reversed on appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the initial stop was justified, and that once the bulge was observed the search was justified, but that removing Mimms from the car was unreasonable because there were no additional facts (beyond those justifying the traffic stop) to justify this seizure.
The US Supreme Court reversed, upholding Mimms' original conviction. In reaching this conclusion, the court balanced the government's substantial interest in the safety of law enforcement officers against Mimm's minimal privacy interest in sitting in the car. The court held that it was reasonable for the officer to remove Mimms from the car without requiring additional facts beyond those which justified the initial stop.
Mimms was stopped for driving with an expired license plate, and at the beginning of the traffic stop he was instructed to get out of the car. There were no particular facts on the record to justify that instruction, it was simply something that the officer chose to do. When Mimms got out of the car, the officer noticed a suspicious bulge in his clothing and searched him for weapons. The bulge was a gun, Mimms was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
He was convicted, but the conviction was reversed on appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the initial stop was justified, and that once the bulge was observed the search was justified, but that removing Mimms from the car was unreasonable because there were no additional facts (beyond those justifying the traffic stop) to justify this seizure.
The US Supreme Court reversed, upholding Mimms' original conviction. In reaching this conclusion, the court balanced the government's substantial interest in the safety of law enforcement officers against Mimm's minimal privacy interest in sitting in the car. The court held that it was reasonable for the officer to remove Mimms from the car without requiring additional facts beyond those which justified the initial stop.
Thursday, June 19, 1997
US Supreme Court US v. Santana 75-19
Decided June 24, 1976
THE hot pursuit case. In this case, an undercover officer arranged to buy drugs from a suspect. The suspect had him drive her to Santana's house, where she went inside and bought drugs with bills that the undercover officer had marked. She came back outside with the heroin, and the undercover officer drove a couple blocks away and arrested her. She told the officer that Santana had the money.
Other officers went back to Santana's house to arrest her. She was standing on the threshold of her house (which the court deemed to be a public place, allowing her to be arrested without a warrant). The police attempted to apprehend her, and she retreaded into her home. They chased her inside and completed the arrest. She was found to be in possession of more heroin and of most of the aforementioned marked bills. At her trial, she sought to exclude that evidence as the fruit of an unlawful entry into her home.
The Supreme Court found the warrantless entry to be reasonable, saying that "a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place...by the expedient of escaping to a private place."
THE hot pursuit case. In this case, an undercover officer arranged to buy drugs from a suspect. The suspect had him drive her to Santana's house, where she went inside and bought drugs with bills that the undercover officer had marked. She came back outside with the heroin, and the undercover officer drove a couple blocks away and arrested her. She told the officer that Santana had the money.
Other officers went back to Santana's house to arrest her. She was standing on the threshold of her house (which the court deemed to be a public place, allowing her to be arrested without a warrant). The police attempted to apprehend her, and she retreaded into her home. They chased her inside and completed the arrest. She was found to be in possession of more heroin and of most of the aforementioned marked bills. At her trial, she sought to exclude that evidence as the fruit of an unlawful entry into her home.
The Supreme Court found the warrantless entry to be reasonable, saying that "a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place...by the expedient of escaping to a private place."
Wednesday, June 4, 1997
US Supreme Court South Dakota v. Opperman 75-76
Decided 7-6-76.
This is the decision that gave us vehicle inventory searches (most lower courts had already upheld the validity of such searches, but this is when SCOTUS weighed in).
Opperman's car was impounded for a parking violation, and at the impound yard an officer conducted an inventory of the valuables in the car (which were later taken to the police department for safekeeping). During the search, the officer found weed in the glove compartment. The owner of the car later collected his valuables from the police department, and was arrested for possession of marijuana. He was convicted, and appealed. The South Dakota Supreme Court overturned his conviction, holding that the inventory violated the federal fourth amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the South Dakota Supreme Court, holding that inventories of impounded vehicles pursuant to standard police procedure are reasonable. The court reasoned that inventory searches are conducted as more of a community caretaker function of the police than an enforcement function, and are necessary to ensure the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody, the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, the protection of the police from potential danger, and to aid in response to incidents of theft or vandalism or attempts to determine whether a vehicle has been stolen.
The court discussed some general search & seizure stuff in this decision, stating that although vehicles are effects (and therefore protected by the fourth amendment), they are not afforded the same level of protection as houses because of their inherent mobility and because of the lesser expectation of privacy that people have in their vehicles compared to their houses. The court also held that it had never subscribed to the notion that the fourth amendment prohibits all searches, or even all warrantless searches, but only unreasonable searches.
This is the decision that gave us vehicle inventory searches (most lower courts had already upheld the validity of such searches, but this is when SCOTUS weighed in).
Opperman's car was impounded for a parking violation, and at the impound yard an officer conducted an inventory of the valuables in the car (which were later taken to the police department for safekeeping). During the search, the officer found weed in the glove compartment. The owner of the car later collected his valuables from the police department, and was arrested for possession of marijuana. He was convicted, and appealed. The South Dakota Supreme Court overturned his conviction, holding that the inventory violated the federal fourth amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the South Dakota Supreme Court, holding that inventories of impounded vehicles pursuant to standard police procedure are reasonable. The court reasoned that inventory searches are conducted as more of a community caretaker function of the police than an enforcement function, and are necessary to ensure the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody, the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, the protection of the police from potential danger, and to aid in response to incidents of theft or vandalism or attempts to determine whether a vehicle has been stolen.
The court discussed some general search & seizure stuff in this decision, stating that although vehicles are effects (and therefore protected by the fourth amendment), they are not afforded the same level of protection as houses because of their inherent mobility and because of the lesser expectation of privacy that people have in their vehicles compared to their houses. The court also held that it had never subscribed to the notion that the fourth amendment prohibits all searches, or even all warrantless searches, but only unreasonable searches.
Sunday, June 1, 1997
US Supreme Court US v. Watson 74-538
Decided January 26, 1976.
Watson was being investigated by a postal inspector for illegal use of credit cards, based on a reliable informant's tip. The informant arranged a meeting with Watson, during which the informant was to give a signal if Watson had stolen credit cards. The informant gave the signal, and Watson was arrested and taken outside of the restaurant. The inspector found no credit cards on Watson's person, and asked him for consent to search his car (after obtaining a Miranda waiver). Watson agreed, and the inspector warned him that anything found would "go against him," and asked again for consent. Watson agreed, the inspector found stolen credit cards, and Watson was later convicted of possessing them.
Watson appealed, arguing that his arrest violated the 4th Amendment because it was made without a warrant, and that his consent was involuntary because he had not been told he could refuse. The 9th circuit agreed with him and reversed his conviction, and the prosecution appealed.
The US Supreme Court reversed the 9th's ruling. The court observed that there was no precedent for requiring a warrant for warrants made in a public place. Obtaining a warrant for cases like these is certainly encouraged by the courts, but they do not require it. Further, the court held that there was no illegal coercion and that although the court may consider whether as suspect was informed of his right to refuse consent as a factor, it's not a conclusive test of voluntariness. Accordingly, Watson's conviction was reinstated.
Monday, May 12, 1997
US Supreme Court Michigan v. Mosley 74-653
Decided December 9, 1975
Mosley was arrested by a Detroit PD detective who was investigating a couple of robberies. He given a Miranda advisement and he initially waived his rights, but after a few questions he said that he didn't want to talk about the robberies (he did not ask for a lawyer, he just said that he didn't want to talk about the robberies). The interrogation was promptly terminated.
A couple hours later, a homicide detective interrogated Mosley about a murder. The murder was entirely unrelated to the robberies, and the interrogation took place in a different location than the robbery interrogation had taken place. Prior to the interrogation, Mosley was again advised of his Miranda rights (which he again waived). Mosley made some incriminating statements, and was eventually convicted of murder. He appealed his conviction, arguing that his statements should have been suppressed under Miranda.
The US Supreme Court discussed the irrational extremes that would be possible under Miranda. On one hand, it Miranda could be applied so that once a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent, the police may never again custodially interrogate him for any reason, about any case, at any time in the future. And any statement made after the invocation of rights could be held to be a per-se violation of Miranda, even if the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and made a statement. On the opposite extreme, Miranda could be held to require that if a suspect invokes his rights then the police need only stop questioning for a moment, and then they may resume the very same interrogation. I'm not making any of this up, it's all discussed in the decision.
Obviously the Court didn't agree with any of the above possibilities. They held that the critical safeguard of Miranda is a suspect's right to "cut off questioning," and so the test for the admissibility of post-advisement statements is whether that right was scrupulously honored. The court also contrasted this case with a previous case from 1966 (Westover v. U.S.). In Westover, a suspect was interrogated for a couple hours by state LEOs without being advised of his rights. Then the feds took over, read him his rights, and he confessed. The court at that time held that the interrogation by federal officials benefited from the pressures of the previous illegal interrogation, and that the advisement was too little, too late. You can't interrogate someone, then read them Miranda, then use a subsequent waiver to rehabilitate (or continue) the earlier interrogation.
This case was not like that one; in this case, the US Supreme Court held that the Detroit PD scrupulously honored Mosley's request to cut off questioning. They didn't refuse to end the first interrogation and they didn't use repeated requested for new interrogations to wear down his resistance. They immediately ceased interrogation when he invoked his rights, and the second interrogation happened after a significant passage of time and a renewed Miranda waiver, and was limited to a crime entirely unrelated to the first interrogation. For these reasons, the Supreme Court held that Mosley's incriminating statements were admissible.
Mosley was arrested by a Detroit PD detective who was investigating a couple of robberies. He given a Miranda advisement and he initially waived his rights, but after a few questions he said that he didn't want to talk about the robberies (he did not ask for a lawyer, he just said that he didn't want to talk about the robberies). The interrogation was promptly terminated.
A couple hours later, a homicide detective interrogated Mosley about a murder. The murder was entirely unrelated to the robberies, and the interrogation took place in a different location than the robbery interrogation had taken place. Prior to the interrogation, Mosley was again advised of his Miranda rights (which he again waived). Mosley made some incriminating statements, and was eventually convicted of murder. He appealed his conviction, arguing that his statements should have been suppressed under Miranda.
The US Supreme Court discussed the irrational extremes that would be possible under Miranda. On one hand, it Miranda could be applied so that once a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent, the police may never again custodially interrogate him for any reason, about any case, at any time in the future. And any statement made after the invocation of rights could be held to be a per-se violation of Miranda, even if the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and made a statement. On the opposite extreme, Miranda could be held to require that if a suspect invokes his rights then the police need only stop questioning for a moment, and then they may resume the very same interrogation. I'm not making any of this up, it's all discussed in the decision.
Obviously the Court didn't agree with any of the above possibilities. They held that the critical safeguard of Miranda is a suspect's right to "cut off questioning," and so the test for the admissibility of post-advisement statements is whether that right was scrupulously honored. The court also contrasted this case with a previous case from 1966 (Westover v. U.S.). In Westover, a suspect was interrogated for a couple hours by state LEOs without being advised of his rights. Then the feds took over, read him his rights, and he confessed. The court at that time held that the interrogation by federal officials benefited from the pressures of the previous illegal interrogation, and that the advisement was too little, too late. You can't interrogate someone, then read them Miranda, then use a subsequent waiver to rehabilitate (or continue) the earlier interrogation.
This case was not like that one; in this case, the US Supreme Court held that the Detroit PD scrupulously honored Mosley's request to cut off questioning. They didn't refuse to end the first interrogation and they didn't use repeated requested for new interrogations to wear down his resistance. They immediately ceased interrogation when he invoked his rights, and the second interrogation happened after a significant passage of time and a renewed Miranda waiver, and was limited to a crime entirely unrelated to the first interrogation. For these reasons, the Supreme Court held that Mosley's incriminating statements were admissible.
Thursday, April 3, 1997
US Supreme Court US v. Edwards 73-88
Decided March 26, 1974
Edwards was arrested for attempting to break into the post office, and some paint chips on his clothing were of evidentiary value. At the time he was arrested the police didn't have any clothes for him to wear, so they waited until the next morning (after they bought a shirt and pants) to seize his clothes as evidence. At his trial, he objected to the admission of his clothes as evidence, saying that their warrantless seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.
The US Supreme Court ruled that the ten hour delay between his arrest and the seizure of his clothing didn't matter, because he (and his clothing) had been in police custody the entire time. The court held under those circumstances, the police were entitled to seize the clothing with or without probable cause (it should be noted that this rested on the fact that the arrest was lawful, pursuant to probable cause).
The court didn't rule that a warrant would never be required when a suspect was already in custody, but it encapsulated its entire ruling with one sentence: "While the legal arrest of a person should not destroy the privacy of his premises, it does—for at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extent— take his own privacy out of the realm of protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and evidence."
Edwards was arrested for attempting to break into the post office, and some paint chips on his clothing were of evidentiary value. At the time he was arrested the police didn't have any clothes for him to wear, so they waited until the next morning (after they bought a shirt and pants) to seize his clothes as evidence. At his trial, he objected to the admission of his clothes as evidence, saying that their warrantless seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.
The US Supreme Court ruled that the ten hour delay between his arrest and the seizure of his clothing didn't matter, because he (and his clothing) had been in police custody the entire time. The court held under those circumstances, the police were entitled to seize the clothing with or without probable cause (it should be noted that this rested on the fact that the arrest was lawful, pursuant to probable cause).
The court didn't rule that a warrant would never be required when a suspect was already in custody, but it encapsulated its entire ruling with one sentence: "While the legal arrest of a person should not destroy the privacy of his premises, it does—for at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extent— take his own privacy out of the realm of protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and evidence."
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)