Decided March 27, 1985
Police responded to a call of a burglary in progress, and found the suspect (Garner) fleeing from the house. The officer attempting to stop Garner could see that he was 17 or 18, and appeared to be unarmed. He identified himself as an officer and ordered Garner to stop. Garner instead continued to flee, and began climbing over a fence. In order to prevent him from escaping, the officer shot him in the back of the head. He died, and was found to have stolen $10 and a purse during the burglary.
The officer was acting under the authority of a state statute which authorized the use of any necessary force to effect an arrest (although most police departments of the time had policies that would have prohibited this use of force, this particular department did not). The state argued in this case that the reasonableness of a seizure depends only on the facts justifying it, and not on how the seizure is actually carried out. The court held that "to determine the constitutionality of a seizure we must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."
The court also explored the justifications for the old common law rule that allowed deadly force to be used to apprehend a fleeing felon, but that rule came from a time when most felonies were punishable by death, and when the use of deadly force generally involved closer combat and therefore was justified in part by the risk to the officer. None of those justifications were found to be appropriate for the modern world, where many felonies are less violent and dangerous than some misdemeanors.
The court ruled that "whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that person. While it is not always clear just when minimal police interference becomes a seizure, there can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment," and that "where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given."
Obviously, under the facts of this case, the use of deadly force was unreasonable.
Wednesday, May 6, 1998
Sunday, May 3, 1998
US Supreme Court Oregon v. Elstad 83-773
Decided March 4, 1985.
Police obtained a warrant for Elstad's arrest after a witness reported seeing him burglarize someone's home (Elstad was 18). The police went to his house, where his mother showed them to his room. One officer then stayed with Elstad while another went with his mother to another room to inform her of the warrant for his arrest. The officer who stayed with Elstad informed him that he believed he had been there for the burglary, and Elstad admitted that he had been.
Elstad was arrested and taken to the station, where he waived his Miranda rights and confessed. At trial, he sought to suppress his confession. He argued that his confession was the fruit of the poisonous tree, being tainted by his earlier unwarned statement that he had been there. The court had none of it, he was convicted, and he appealed. The court of appeals took Elstad's side and reversed his conviction. The prosecution appealed.
The US Supreme Court ordered Elstad's conviction reinstated. Here's why: Miranda warnings (like the exclusionary rule) are not actually required by the Constitution. They are a judicially created measure designed to protect a constitutional right. Where a Miranda violation has occurred, a suspect's statements will be presumed to be involuntary and suppressed, but if the statements were not actually made as the result of coercive police conduct the 5th Amendment isn't actually being violated so the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine doesn't apply. In this case, the prosecution had already conceded that Elstad was in custody at the time of his first incriminating statement (I don't think they should've conceded that. If they had argued the point, then I think they would have won this case on those grounds), so the Court accepted that conclusion. But even without Miranda warnings, the Court held that the statement was obviously voluntary. It was made in Elbert's home (hardly a police dominated atmosphere), there was no show of force or other coercive police conduct, it was made in response to an off-hand comment rather than after extensive interrogation. Obviously voluntary. Since the prosecution conceded the issue of custody, and since there was no Miranda warning given, the statement was inadmissible in court, but since the statement was not coerced there was no actual violation of Elstad's rights.
If Elstad's rights had been violated, then the second confession could have been admissible anyway if there was a sufficient break in the causal chain between his earlier statement and his later one. But since his rights weren't violated, no break in the causal chain was necessary. All that was necessary was that his second statement also be voluntary (and, of course, made after a Miranda waiver). Since that requirement was met, the statement should not have been suppressed.
Friday, April 10, 1998
Colorado Supreme Court People v. Berow 83SA498 83SA506
Decided October 9, 1984.
Berow and her husband lived in a hotel, and went on a vacation to California. Before leaving, they asked the manager to watch their room and "arrest any intruders." While they were gone, the manager found the door had been tampered with and thought he saw someone inside. He called the cops. Even though the door had been tampered with, it was apparently still secured from inside by a chain lock. Believing that a burglary was in progress, the officer forced entry.
No one was found inside, but while searching only in areas where a person could hide the officer found a hash pipe and some marijuana plants. He left the apartment, got a search warrant, returned and seized the evidence. The trial court suppressed the evidence and the people appealed.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the apparent in-progress burglary constituted exigent circumstances justifying the officer's entry, and that additionally the hotel manager had apparently been given authority to consent to the officer's entry. Once inside, the officer found the items in plain view and did not deviate from the original purpose of the search until he had obtained a warrant. The order suppressing the evidence was reversed.
Tuesday, April 7, 1998
US Supreme Court US v. Leon 82-1771
Decided July 5, 1984
An untested confidential informant made some allegations against some people, the cops investigated at great length, and eventually applied for a search warrant for three houses. The warrant application was reviewed by several deputy district attorneys before making its way to the magistrate, who found that there was probable cause. The warrant was issued, and evidence obtained from the searches led to several arrests (including Leon's) for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine.
The defendants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. The trial court held that this was a close case, and that the investigating officer had acted in good faith in his investigation, but that the affidavit did not contain sufficient information and the warrant should not have been issued. Accordingly, the evidence was suppressed. The people appealed.
The case gets more interesting when the court discusses the exclusionary rule. Essentially, the exclusionary says that if evidence is obtained as the result of unlawful police conduct, then that evidence may not be introduced in the prosecution's case in chief (the evidence can still be used for other purposes, such as for cross-examining the defendant and for testimony in front of a grand jury). And there's nothing in the Constitution which guarantees the suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence; the fourth amendment establishes the people's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, but it doesn't say anything about what should happen with evidence that is obtained when that right is violated. The exclusionary rule was a sanction created by the courts to ensure that law enforcement would not systemically violate people's rights.
That's a key point: the exclusionary rule doesn't exist to vindicate someone's rights (that's what lawsuits are for). The exclusionary rule exists to discourage police misconduct, and so it should only be applied in circumstances where it will actually accomplish that goal. In a case like this one, the police had already done everything they could to comply with the law. They sought the guidance of a neutral magistrate by applying for a search warrant, and they were entitled to rely on the magistrate's judgment. When the police are acting in good faith reliance on a search warrant they believe to be valid, but that warrant is later found to be invalid for some reason, the evidence is still admissible. And so the good faith exception was born.
Of course, this exception won't save a warrant that obtained by presenting faulty information to a judge when the officers knew or should have known that the information was false. It also won't help if the warrant is obviously invalid (such as warrants that don't particularly describe the place to be searched or the item to be seized), warrants that are based on affidavits obviously devoid of probable cause, or "rubber stamped " warrants (meaning warrants issued by a judges who will grant anything just because the cops asked for it).
An untested confidential informant made some allegations against some people, the cops investigated at great length, and eventually applied for a search warrant for three houses. The warrant application was reviewed by several deputy district attorneys before making its way to the magistrate, who found that there was probable cause. The warrant was issued, and evidence obtained from the searches led to several arrests (including Leon's) for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine.
The defendants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. The trial court held that this was a close case, and that the investigating officer had acted in good faith in his investigation, but that the affidavit did not contain sufficient information and the warrant should not have been issued. Accordingly, the evidence was suppressed. The people appealed.
The case gets more interesting when the court discusses the exclusionary rule. Essentially, the exclusionary says that if evidence is obtained as the result of unlawful police conduct, then that evidence may not be introduced in the prosecution's case in chief (the evidence can still be used for other purposes, such as for cross-examining the defendant and for testimony in front of a grand jury). And there's nothing in the Constitution which guarantees the suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence; the fourth amendment establishes the people's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, but it doesn't say anything about what should happen with evidence that is obtained when that right is violated. The exclusionary rule was a sanction created by the courts to ensure that law enforcement would not systemically violate people's rights.
That's a key point: the exclusionary rule doesn't exist to vindicate someone's rights (that's what lawsuits are for). The exclusionary rule exists to discourage police misconduct, and so it should only be applied in circumstances where it will actually accomplish that goal. In a case like this one, the police had already done everything they could to comply with the law. They sought the guidance of a neutral magistrate by applying for a search warrant, and they were entitled to rely on the magistrate's judgment. When the police are acting in good faith reliance on a search warrant they believe to be valid, but that warrant is later found to be invalid for some reason, the evidence is still admissible. And so the good faith exception was born.
Of course, this exception won't save a warrant that obtained by presenting faulty information to a judge when the officers knew or should have known that the information was false. It also won't help if the warrant is obviously invalid (such as warrants that don't particularly describe the place to be searched or the item to be seized), warrants that are based on affidavits obviously devoid of probable cause, or "rubber stamped " warrants (meaning warrants issued by a judges who will grant anything just because the cops asked for it).
Monday, April 6, 1998
US Supreme Court New York v. Quarles 82-1213
Decided June 12, 1984
This decision created the well-known public safety exception to Miranda.
A couple of cops were approached by a woman who claimed that she had just been raped by a man with a gun. She described the suspect, and said that he had gone to a particular supermarket. The cops went to that store, where the found Quarles (who matched the suspect description).
As soon as he saw the cops, Quarles took off running. They chased, lost sight of him briefly, but caught him a moment later. He was held at gunpoint, handcuffed, and searched, and there were at least four cops present. He was in possession of an empty shoulder holster.
One of the cops asked Quarles "Where's the gun?" Quarles nodded to some boxes and told him the gun was over there. After recovering the gun, the officer read Quarles the Miranda warnings. Quarles waived his rights, and made some additional incriminating statements.
The trial court suppressed the gun and Quarles' statements, reasoning that all of that evidence was tainted by the officer's failure to read Miranda before asking Quarles where the gun was. The prosecution appealed all the way to the US Supreme Court.
The Court explained that the Miranda warnings aren't actually constitutional rights themselves, but court-created procedural safeguards which protect the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. At the time that the court had created this safeguard, it accepted that requiring officers to Mirandize suspects would result in fewer convictions. But this situation is different: the gun which was discarded somewhere in the store posed a safety risk. The court held that unlike the risk of a later acquittal, a present risk of physical harm is more important than the procedural safeguard of Miranda warnings. The court also noted that Quarles' incriminating statements weren't obtained by the sort of coercion that Miranda was intented to prevent. So the court created a narrow exception to Miranda, allowing unwarned statements in circumstances like these to be used as evidence by the prosecution (as long as those statements are the result of the sort of questioning which is necessary to address a safety risk).
This decision created the well-known public safety exception to Miranda.
A couple of cops were approached by a woman who claimed that she had just been raped by a man with a gun. She described the suspect, and said that he had gone to a particular supermarket. The cops went to that store, where the found Quarles (who matched the suspect description).
As soon as he saw the cops, Quarles took off running. They chased, lost sight of him briefly, but caught him a moment later. He was held at gunpoint, handcuffed, and searched, and there were at least four cops present. He was in possession of an empty shoulder holster.
One of the cops asked Quarles "Where's the gun?" Quarles nodded to some boxes and told him the gun was over there. After recovering the gun, the officer read Quarles the Miranda warnings. Quarles waived his rights, and made some additional incriminating statements.
The trial court suppressed the gun and Quarles' statements, reasoning that all of that evidence was tainted by the officer's failure to read Miranda before asking Quarles where the gun was. The prosecution appealed all the way to the US Supreme Court.
The Court explained that the Miranda warnings aren't actually constitutional rights themselves, but court-created procedural safeguards which protect the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. At the time that the court had created this safeguard, it accepted that requiring officers to Mirandize suspects would result in fewer convictions. But this situation is different: the gun which was discarded somewhere in the store posed a safety risk. The court held that unlike the risk of a later acquittal, a present risk of physical harm is more important than the procedural safeguard of Miranda warnings. The court also noted that Quarles' incriminating statements weren't obtained by the sort of coercion that Miranda was intented to prevent. So the court created a narrow exception to Miranda, allowing unwarned statements in circumstances like these to be used as evidence by the prosecution (as long as those statements are the result of the sort of questioning which is necessary to address a safety risk).
Saturday, April 4, 1998
US Supreme Court US v. Jacobsen 82-1167
Decided April 2, 1984.
FedEx employees accidentally damaged a package with a forklift, and so they examined the contents of the package (apparently there's a policy that they do that with damaged goods for insurance reasons). They found that the package contained nothing except baggies of white powder, so the called the police. A federal agent arrived (by then the FedEx employees had put the cocaine back in the package, but didn't seal it), reopened the package, and extracted a small sample from the baggies with a knife. It tested positive for cocaine, and the feds got a warrant for the house that the cocaine was being shipped to. Jacobsen et al were arrested at that house, charged with and convicted of possession with intent to distribute. They appealed their conviction, arguing that the warrant was obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure.
The US Supreme Court explained that the Fourth Amendment restricts two different categories of government actions: searches (where the government infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable) and seizures (where the government interferes with a person's possessory interest in the item being seized). The Fourth Amendment only protects against government actions. If a private person conducts a search that would be unreasonable for a police officer, that search does not violate the Fourth Amendment. So the initial search by the FedEx employees doesn't require the suppression of any evidence.
The rule for subsequent warrantless searches by law enforcement are that they can not expend the scope of the original private search. Jacobsen's expectation of privacy in the package was compromised by the actions of the FedEx employees (the same as it would have been if he had given the package to a third person who had chosen of his own accord to open it for the police). Once an expectation of privacy is compromised by a private person, the police are not required to ignore information obtained from that source. And reexamining the cocaine wasn't likely to reveal any information other than what the feds already knew from the FedEx employees. So even though the cocaine was repackaged when the feds got there, the agents were within their authority when they took it out of the package to examine it.
Holding on to the package instead of allowing it to continue on to its destination was a seizure, but it was held to be a reasonable one because the package obviously contained contraband. Field testing the cocaine (which involved removing a trace amount with the knife and destroying it) was a more serious seizure, because it was permanent. This was still held to be reasonable, because the courts balanced the government's interests in enforcing drug laws against the defendant's possessory interest in the cocaine. Since people do not have a legitimate possessory interest in contraband, since the outcome of the test was virtually certain before the test was conducted, and since the amount removed for the test was so slight, the government's interests were held to outweight Jacobsen's interests in this case, and the seizure was held reasonable.
Jacobsen et al's convictions were upheld.
Thursday, March 12, 1998
US Supreme Court US v. Place 81-1617
Decided 6-20-83.
Place was flying from Miami to New York when he somehow aroused the suspicion of law enforcement officers. They contacted him, and he presented ID and consented to a search of his checked luggage. The police did not search him, because his flight was due to leave in ten minutes. As they released him, he made some remark about how he had recognized that they were police officers. Because of this (?), they did a little more digging and figured out that he had listed fake addresses on his luggage tags. They called the police in New York to let them know Place was coming.
In New York, DEA agents contacted Place as he about to leave the airport with his luggage. He made the same remark about knowing that they were cops. They told him that based on their own observations and on information from Miami, they believed he was carrying narcotics. They asked for consent to search his luggage, and he refused. They told him that they were going to detain his luggage in order to get a search warrant, and gave him a choice to either accompany them or not. He chose not.
The DEA "detained" Place's luggage for about an hour and a half, then ran a dog on it. The dog alerted on one of the two bags. This was on a Friday, and they held on to the luggage until Monday when they got a warrant for the bag the dog had alerted on. There was cocaine in there, and Place was later arrested.
The trial court applied the reasoning of Terry v. Ohio to the DEA's "detention" of Place's luggage. The Court of Appeals called bullshit on the 90 minute detention, and this case found it's way to the Supreme Court.
The Court ruled that the authority to briefly detain people based on reasonable suspicion also applied to the detention of property, so the initial detention of the luggage was permissible. The court also ruled that because a K9 sniff involves such limited intrusion, and only gives the police information about the presence of contraband (which people do not have a right to possess, and therefore have no legitimate privacy interest in), a K9 sniff is not a search for fourth amendment purposes and does not require probable cause. Finally, although the court declined to put a specific time limit on investigative detentions, the court held that the facts of this case did not support a 90 minute detention of luggage. So even though this decision expanded government authority to both detain property and conduct K9 sniffs, the police in this case violated the fourth amendment and Place's conviction was reversed.
Place was flying from Miami to New York when he somehow aroused the suspicion of law enforcement officers. They contacted him, and he presented ID and consented to a search of his checked luggage. The police did not search him, because his flight was due to leave in ten minutes. As they released him, he made some remark about how he had recognized that they were police officers. Because of this (?), they did a little more digging and figured out that he had listed fake addresses on his luggage tags. They called the police in New York to let them know Place was coming.
In New York, DEA agents contacted Place as he about to leave the airport with his luggage. He made the same remark about knowing that they were cops. They told him that based on their own observations and on information from Miami, they believed he was carrying narcotics. They asked for consent to search his luggage, and he refused. They told him that they were going to detain his luggage in order to get a search warrant, and gave him a choice to either accompany them or not. He chose not.
The DEA "detained" Place's luggage for about an hour and a half, then ran a dog on it. The dog alerted on one of the two bags. This was on a Friday, and they held on to the luggage until Monday when they got a warrant for the bag the dog had alerted on. There was cocaine in there, and Place was later arrested.
The trial court applied the reasoning of Terry v. Ohio to the DEA's "detention" of Place's luggage. The Court of Appeals called bullshit on the 90 minute detention, and this case found it's way to the Supreme Court.
The Court ruled that the authority to briefly detain people based on reasonable suspicion also applied to the detention of property, so the initial detention of the luggage was permissible. The court also ruled that because a K9 sniff involves such limited intrusion, and only gives the police information about the presence of contraband (which people do not have a right to possess, and therefore have no legitimate privacy interest in), a K9 sniff is not a search for fourth amendment purposes and does not require probable cause. Finally, although the court declined to put a specific time limit on investigative detentions, the court held that the facts of this case did not support a 90 minute detention of luggage. So even though this decision expanded government authority to both detain property and conduct K9 sniffs, the police in this case violated the fourth amendment and Place's conviction was reversed.
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